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"Rogue States" Within American
Borders: Remedying State
Noncompliance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Margaret Thomas
Nearly a decade after the United States ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the treaty's implementation is
incomplete. A complex maze of reservations, understandings, and declara-
tions has hindered domestic implementation, as has Congress 's failure to
pass national implementing legislation. Almost every state in the Union has
laws that violate the Covenant. For example, the treaty requires that in
criminal matters, juveniles must be tried in a manner that takes account of
their age. Nevertheless, California and many other states frequently treat
minors as adults in such matters. Because the Senate declared the treaty to
be non-self-executing, the question arises whether there is any legal rem-
edyfor state breaches of this U.S. treaty obligation.
The Supremacy Clause exclusively regulates the relationship between
treaties and states. Nothing in the Supremacy Clause requires congres-
sional implementation of a treaty in order for that treaty to supersede state
law. Congress's failure to implement the treaty merely displaces the pri-
mary burden of enforcement to the states. The Senate's declaration that the
Covenant shall not be self-executing in no way diminishes state courts'
duty to enforce the treaty. Though the declaration may limit the federal
courts' ability to recognize private rights of action based on the treaty,
federal courts have demonstrated an increasing willingness to entertain
claims to treaty rights asserted against the government. Both state and fed-
eral courts have the power to bring wayward state laws into compliance
with the Covenant's obligation.
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade after the United States ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("the Covenant"), t arguably one of
the most important guarantees of human rights in history, the treaty's
implementation in this country is incomplete. The Senate burdened the
document's ratification with a complex maze of reservations, understand-
ings, and declarations ("RUDs") that have significantly hampered the
treaty's enforcement at the federal level. Eight years after ratification,
Congress has yet to enact legislation implementing the treaty nationally,
and courts and state legislatures have paid scant attention to the document.
While domestic enforcement of human rights treaties like the
Covenant has generally received little attention from the American legal
establishment, recent events suggest that the time may be ripe for such
treaties to move out of legal obscurity. On May 3, 2001, the United
Nations' fifty-three-nation Economic and Social Council conducted its
periodic regional elections for the Human Rights Commission. The elec-
tion results excluded the United States from the commission for the first
time since the United Nations' founding and thereby directed international
attention to America's international human rights policies.2 That event, in
turn, set the stage for the June 2001 issuance of an opinion by the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") that pointedly criticized the United
States for failing to enforce certain human rights guarantees within
America's own borders.
The ICJ's decision has already begun to impact the debate about
America's domestic treaty implementation responsibilities. For example, in
the context of a clemency decision, Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating
recently considered whether to honor the ICJ's ruling in his state when he
was faced with a case involving a violation of precisely the same rights at
issue in the ICJ's opinion.4 In reaching his decision to deny clemency, he
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
available at http:l/www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcherlmulti/textslBH498.txt.
2. The three seats allocated to Western countries went to France, Austria, and Sweden. See
CNN, U.S. Ousted from U.N. Human Rights Commission (May 3, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/05/03/us.human/.
3. The ICJ specifically chastised the United States for executing a German citizen without
affording him the rights guaranteed by the Vienna Convention. Press Release, International Court of
Justice, LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America): The Court Finds that the United States
has Breached its Obligations to Germany and to the LaGrand Brothers Under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (June 27, 2001), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress200l/ipresscom200l-16_20010627.htm.
4. Press Release, Governor Frank Keating, Governor Denies Clemency for Convicted Killer
(July 20, 2001), available at http://www.governor.state.ok.us/novaldez.htm; see also Brooke A.
Masters, U.S. Deprived Mexican of Fair Trial, Appeal Says; Death Row Inmante Wasn't Told He
Could Enlist His Country's Aid; Okla. Case Could Set Precedent, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 23, 2001,
at A8; Governor Denies Clemency for Killer Despite Mexico Plea, CHI. TaIB., July 21, 2001, at 12.
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had to weigh whether and how the treaty right at issue ought to be given
force in his state.5
Keating has not been alone in considering the potential impact of
human rights treaties upon domestic capital sentences. Some commentators
now look to U.S. treaty obligations as a primary means of reforming capital
punishment procedures.6 As the current controversy over state laws permit-
ting execution of mentally retarded criminals intensifies,' American courts
may have to confront authoritative treaty interpretations holding that such
executions violate basic human rights.'
The force of treaties like the Covenant upon domestic law is far from
settled. Nevertheless, scholarly commentators appear certain that the issue
of domestic enforceability of treaties is purely a federal question.' This
view is epitomized by the scholarly controversy regarding whether princi-
ples of federalism limit the scope of treaties' domestic enforceability.
Professor Curtis Bradley criticizes the use of human rights treaties by the
federal government to control areas of law reserved to the states by the
Tenth Amendment. l" In contrast, Professor David Golove sets forth a
historical and structural constitutional argument defending such use of
federal power and asserting the need to present a "unified national front" to
5. Letter from Governor Frank Keating to Vicente Fox (July 20, 2001), available at
http://www.govemor.state.ok.us/novaldez.htm. See also Press Release, Governor Keating, supra note
4; Mexico to Appeal Valdez Execution, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 22, 2001, at 3A.
6. See, e.g., Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders with Mental Retardation,
13 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1, pt. II (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter HuM. RTS. WATCH], at
http:lwwv.hnv.org/reportsf200lustatustat03Ol.htm#TopOfPage.
7. See Eric Lichtblau, Death Penalty Reforms Gather New Momentum, L.A. TImEs, June 25,
2001, at Al (citing recent controversies in Florida, Texas, Alabama, and North Carolina over such
executions). Additionally, in March 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to revisit the constitutionality
of such executions. McCarver v. North Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001) (granting certiorari).
Arguments in McCarver will take place sometime in the 2001-02 term, but already several American
diplomats have filed a brief as amici curiae urging the Justices to forbid executions of the mentally
retarded based on standards of decency derived from the U.N. Human Rights Commission and a
growing international consensus that isolates the United States diplomatically. Brief of Amici Curiae
Diplomats Morton Abmmowitz et al. in Support of Petitioner at 7-13, McCarver v. North Carolina, 121
S. Ct. 1401 (2001) (No. 00-8727). Although the McCarver case appears to have recently become moot,
in September 2001 the Supreme Court agreed to hear another similar case raising the same issue.
Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 24 (2001).
8. See HUm. RTs. WATCH, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-
Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DFPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993) (discussing
federal implementation through the executive branch); Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding
Teeth to United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International
Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAuL L. REv. 1209 (1993) (discussing federal
implementation through a proposed act of Congress); John Quigley, The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. RV. 1287 (1993) (discussing
implementation through the federal judiciary).
10. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 402
(1998).
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advance our national interests. Both Bradley and Golove implicitly
assume that such treaties are specific, federal actions imposed upon states.
They view such treaties only as potential sets of federally-made rules oper-
ating at a national level. Their arguments ignore the possibility that states
themselves might choose to carry out treaty provisions using their own
local implementation methods.
A second, related controversy animating recent scholarly literature
turns upon whether national implementing legislation is necessary before a
treaty can have domestic effect. Professor John Yoo analyzes both struc-
tural separation-of-powers issues in this area and the original intent of the
Framers and contends that the federal judiciary should not enforce treaties
affecting domestic areas normally reserved by the Constitution to Congress
unless Congress itself passes national implementing legislation.'2 Professor
Carlos Vazquez, on the other hand, argues that the Constitution mandates
that all such treaties should have automatic effect with the force of law,
regardless of whether Congress implements them with legislation. 3 As in
the federalism controversy, this debate has overlooked the possibility that
states themselves might implement the treaties independent of any con-
gressional command, such as through legislatures, state courts, or guberna-
torial orders.
Thus, although there is a wealth of academic literature addressing
human rights treaty implementation at the federal level, implementation at
the state level has generally either gone unnoticed or has been assumed to
be a mere by-product of the federal implementation process.'4 This
Comment considers the problem of domestic enforceability of treaties such
as the Covenant from a broader perspective, considering implementation as
a dual problem fully situated within both federal and state government sys-
tems. To better understand the enforceability problem, the Comment be-
gins with an examination of the specific nature of the treaty obligation. It
then considers the historical complexities in the U.S. ratification of the
Covenant, analyzing the manner in which the Senate's reservations, under-
standings, and declarations purport to limit and modify that obligation.
11. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1078-81 (2000).
12. John C. Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense
of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2219-20 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking]; see also John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1960-62 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism
and the Constitution].
13. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Response: Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154,2156-59
(1999).
14. James Nafzinger attempted to address the relationship between states and treaties by
advocating that states participate in the treaty ratification process. James A. R. Nafziger, State
Collaboration in United States Ratification of Human Rights Treaties, 3 I.L.S.A. J. INT'L & CoiMP. L.
621, 627 (1997). Even this state-focused solution, however, takes place purely at the federal level
(namely, during ratification).
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With a clear picture of the final obligation the United States ratified, it then
turns to the problem of domestic noncompliance by the several states.
To facilitate an in-depth analysis of domestic noncompliance, this
Comment examines an example of state legislation that deviates from the
Covenant's terms. The procedural mechanisms by which states prosecute
minors presents an area of law well suited to such an examination because
it tends to be insulated from national legislation by federalism principles.15
The Covenant provides concrete rules regarding criminal procedures
for children. It explicitly obligates party states to ensure that "[i]n the case
of juvenile persons, the [trial] procedure shall be such as will take account
of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation."16 Despite
this obligation, almost every state in the Union has laws facilitating trial of
juveniles in adult court. 7 In fact, the United States has experienced a recent
wave of state legislation facilitating the trial of youths as adults, though the
practice of treating minors as adults appears on its face to contravene the
Covenant's mandate to "take account of their age." To take effect and
bring the United States into compliance with the Covenant's language,
almost every state would have to alter existing practices. 8
California's Proposition 21, "The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime
Prevention Act," provides a useful example of such state disregard of the
15. Although several commentators have discussed the possibility of using the Covenant to
prevent the execution of juveniles (by federal or state governments), see, e.g., Connie de ]a Vega &
Jennifer Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation Provide a Sanctuary for the Juvenile Death
Penalty?, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 735 (1998), such challenges are hindered by the Senate's explicit
reservation of the right to execute "any person" as a condition of treaty ratification. See 138 CONG.
REc. § S4781, S4783 (1992) (relating Senate debate regarding the Covenant). The exceptional nature of
this blanket reservation makes such state capital punishment laws a particularly unsuitable example
upon which to test the Covenant's general enforceability. On August 13, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court
confirmed its unwillingness to reexamine the application of the death penalty to minors, denying a stay
in one such case. Beazley v. Johnson, 122 S. Ct. 11 (2001). The case, involving a Texas offender who
was sentenced to die at just fifteen, drew international condemnation. In a strongly worded statement,
representatives of the Council of Europe said that Beazley's execution "contravened international legal
standards and was against the norms of civilised society." CNN, Europe Steps in to Death Row Case
(Aug. 15, 2001), at http:llwww.cnn.com/200lWORLD/europelO8/15beazley.europe/index.html; see
also Council of Europe, Council of Europe Leaders Call on Governor of Texas to Stay Execution of
Napoleon Beazley (Aug. 14, 2001), at http://www.coe.int/portal.asp?strScreenType=100&L=E&M=$t/
I-0-0-2/0I/News200108/EMB,1,0,0,2,Beazley.stm.
16. Covenant, supra note 1, art. 14, para. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
17. Arianna Huffington, The New Callousness: California's Prop. 21 Shows that Politicians
Would Rather Put Troubled Kids Behind Bars than Rehabilitate Them (Mar. 2, 2000), at
http:lvww.salon.comfpolitics2000/feature/2000/03/02/Callousness/index.html.
18. By the 1990s, virtually every state had approved legislation permitting trial of juveniles as
adults. PBS, Frontline Juvenile Justice Report, Child or Adult? A Century Long View, at
http:lwvw.pbs.orglwgbhlpages/frontline/shows/juvenile/stats/childadult.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2001) [hereinafter Child or Adult]; see also Jolanta Juszkiewicz, Building Blocks for Youth Initiative,
Youth Crime/Adult Time: Is Justice Served, at http:/vww.buildingblocksforyouth.org/ycatycat.html.
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treaty. 9 Nearly 4.5 million California voters supported Proposition 21's
mandate that courts try many more juveniles as adults.2 ° Voter approval of
Proposition 21 places California squarely in breach of the Covenant's
requirement that trial procedures take account of a juvenile's age.2' This
Comment will evaluate Proposition 21's conflict with the Covenant's pro-
cedural justice guarantees to children as a case study of treaty obligations
at the state level.22
In California as elsewhere, the peculiar legal features of treaty imple-
mentation at the state level have been largely neglected by both judges and
scholarly commentators. Concluding that laws such as California's
Proposition 21 violate the Covenant's terms, this Comment considers sev-
eral possible solutions to the problem of state noncompliance. It argues that
state enforcement and federal enforcement of treaties each present separate,
independent questions. First, at the state level, it contends the Senate's dec-
laration of non-self-execution has no effect.23  It argues that
19. Although this Comment focuses upon the specific mechanism and language of California's
Proposition 21 as a case study, the same argument clearly extends to similar legislation in other states
as well. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77, 80.
20. By contrast, only 2.7 million voters opposed the ballot initiative. Secretary of State Bill Jones
Website, Vote 2000, State Ballot Measures: Statewide Returns, at http://primary2000.ss.ca.gov/
retums/prop/00.htm (June 2, 2000).
21. Several state court challenges presently impede the new law's implementation in California.
These challenges, however, are confined to state law and ignore relevant international obligations. The
legal challenges appear to have overlooked the fact that the state's procedures for transferring minors
into the adult criminal system explicitly violate the plain language of the Covenant's trial procedure
requirements. See infra text accompanying notes 101-104.
22. The treaty obligation conflicts with popular state juvenile justice provisions throughout the
country. This conflict has significant policy implications for juvenile justice reform generally. For
example, if juveniles cannot be transferred to adult court because of the treaty provisions, states will
likely look to other reform possibilities. Such possibilities include lowering the age boundary at which
adult courts automatically acquire jurisdiction by redefining "adulthood" to begin at a younger age. A
few states have already begun experimenting with this path, lowering the age boundary for all crimes to
sixteen. Robert 0. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE 45, 47 (Julian Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000). Since the Covenant does
not itself define the age at which one must be considered a juvenile, such reforms would likely sidestep
its provisions and channel vastly more young people into the adult criminal system than current transfer
mechanisms, thus creating an even harsher situation than presently exists. Furthermore, other reform
possibilities such as so-called "blended jurisdiction" (in which juvenile courts have the power to issue
complex sentences at least as long as those of adult criminal courts) also arguably would meet the
Covenant's requirements, while creating significant policy problems of their own. See, e.g., Richard E.
Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 145, 145-79 (Julian Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000); Franklin
E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 207,
215 (Julian Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000). From a juvenile justice perspective, the
selectivity of transfer mechanisms like those in Proposition 21 may arguably be among the "lesser
evils" of the reform possibilities, as these mechanisms tend to be both specific and targeted while other
possibilities are not. Though such particularized policy considerations are outside the scope of this
Comment, they are worth mentioning as a backdrop to the broader question of the implications of the
Covenant's domestic legal force.
23. Non-self-execution implies that the treaty requires implementing legislation. See infra text
accompanying notes 48-49.
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non-self-execution preserves for Congress the right to implement treaties
negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate affecting an area of
domestic concern that would normally fall exclusively under Congress's
purview. Historical and structural analysis of the principles underlying
non-self-execution supports the conclusion that it exists to regulate and
balance the relationship between the foreign-affairs power of the President
and Senate under Article II, and Congress's legislative power under
Article I. Such separation-of-powers balancing becomes irrelevant when
the treaty does not reach into an area reserved to Congress under Article I;
if the treaty reaches into an area reserved to the states, non-self-execution
doctrine simply is not triggered. Instead, the Supremacy Clause exclusively
regulates the relationship between treaties and states, making the treaties
binding on states as a matter of course. Nothing in the Supremacy Clause
requires congressional implementation of a treaty before that treaty super-
sedes state law. The treaty automatically supersedes state law by constitu-
tional command the moment it takes effect.
This Comment thus argues that the absence of congressional
implementing legislation merely displaces the primary implementation
burden from the national government to each of the states. Indeed, one can
read Congress's inaction as deliberate deference to the states, permitting
states to implement the treaty through their own courts and legislatures.
Such local implementation of the treaty's baseline standards and proce-
dures encourages unique enforcement solutions tailored to each state's spe-
cific situation. In the absence of proper state implementation, however,
state courts have a duty to enforce such treaties as "supreme Law of the
Land,"24 regardless of the treaty's implementation status before Congress.
This Comment thus concludes that the Covenant's provisions obligate state
courts to strike down laws like California's Proposition 21.
Secondly, this Comment considers the enforceability of the
Covenant's rights in the alternate venue of federal courts. Surveying the
cases involving Covenant rights brought before federal judges in the years
following ratification, this Comment concludes that in practice, federal
courts appear to have implicitly drawn a distinction between private, civil
rights against other citizens (which provide no federal right of action), and
public rights to protection against the government (for which the courts
appear willing to entertain claims).
This analysis of the dual enforcement schema of state and federal
courts reveals that the Senate's declaration of non-self-execution does not
disable enforcement of the rights that the Covenant confers against the
government. On the contrary, the non-self-execution declaration instead
creates a bifurcated enforcement framework whereby certain rights creat-
ing a private, civil cause of action are unenforceable in federal court,
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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whereas with few exceptions, other rights asserted against the government
in a criminal context are enforceable in any venue, federal or state. This
Comment thus concludes that Proposition 21, and laws like it in other
states, cannot withstand the treaty's force. Both state and federal institu-
tions can provide appropriate remedies to bring wayward state laws into
compliance with the Covenant's obligation.
I
THE PROBLEM OF NONCOMPLIANCE
A. Promises Made: The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
In the middle of the twentieth century, World War II's tragedies pro-
duced a revolutionary international interest in the codification of human
rights. This interest first manifested itself in the United Nations Charter and
its requirement that U.N. members endeavor to promote human rights.25 In
1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights without a dissenting vote.26 While the
Declaration defined the rights guaranteed by nations to individuals, it
stopped short of creating a binding international obligation.27
The final step necessary for realizing the postwar human rights vision
was a global treaty that would create legal duties for signatories. In 1966,
the General Assembly adopted the text of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights to fulfill this need.28 Led by the United States,
General Assembly members saw the Covenant as a means to strengthen the
Charter's human rights ideals.2 9 The Covenant went into force internation-
ally in 1976,30 and at least 147 nations are now parties to it.3 Proponents
have hailed the document alternately as the "modern Magna Carta" and the
"international Bill of Rights."32
The Covenant imposes an explicit duty upon signatories to execute its
provisions, providing in part, "each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to take the necessary steps... to adopt such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the
present Covenant."33 It contains a corollary duty of remedy and relief,
25. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 1289.
26. U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (Hurst
Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993) [hereinafter U.S. RATIFICATION].
27. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 1288.
28. See id.
29. Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, supra note 9, at 1211.
30. Quigley, supra note 9, at 1288.
31. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 173, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SCR.E/1 9, (2001) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
32. See Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, supra note 9, at 1209, 1211.
33. Covenant, supra note 1, at art. 2, para. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74.
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requiring party states first to "ensure that any person whose rights [under
the Covenant] ... are violated shall have an effective remedy ...." and
second to provide individuals a right to have such remedy "determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities... of the
State."34 Of special significance to the United States, article 50 specifies
that the treaty's provisions "extend to all parts of federal States without any
limitations or exceptions." '35
The Covenant expressly prohibits party states from derogating any of
the fundamental human rights that it recognizes, except in time of national
emergency.36 Further, the Covenant provides mechanisms to ensure that
party states comply with its provisions. It specifically creates a Human
Rights Committee composed of nationals of party states to act as the pri-
mary enforcement body,37 and signatories have a duty to report to the
Human Rights Committee "on the progress made in the enjoyment of
[Covenant] rights."3 Thus, although the treaty is fundamentally self-
policing, a nation's accession signals a willingness to undergo international
scrutiny of its domestic human rights policies. 39
B. Promises Confused: Ratification of the Covenant's Human Rights
Guarantees
The Covenant went into force in this country on September 8, 1992.40
However, the Covenant's ratification history was tortuous. Although
President Carter signed the Covenant in 1977, the Senate refused to grant
its consent to ratification throughout the 1980s.4 After allowing the treaty
34. Id. art. 2, para. 3(a), (b), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
35. Id. art. 50, 999 U.N.T.S. at 201.
36. Id. art. 4-5, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. Emergency derogation, however, specifically excludes any
contravention of the Covenant's provisions regarding the right to life; freedom of conscience, thought,
and religion; the right to be free of torture; slavery; imprisonment for default on a contractual
obligation; and ex post facto prosecution. See Id. art. 4, para. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
37. Id. art. 28,999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
38. Id. art. 40, par. 1,999 U.N.T.S. at 181.
39. When a state believes another party state is not fulfilling its Covenant obligations, it may
complain about such abuses by drafting a letter to the allegedly derogating state. Covenant, supra note
1, at art. 41, 999 U.N.T.S. at 182. Should the letter fail to resolve the situation, the Human Rights
Committee will conduct a series of meetings with the complaining and accused parties to find a
"friendly solution." Id. If such a solution is not forthcoming, the committee may appoint a special Ad
Hoe Conciliation Commission as a last resort. The commission ultimately issues a public report of its
findings and provides a detailed record of the matter. Id. art. 42, 999 U.N.T.S. at 183-84. However, this
enforcement mechanism exists more in theory than practice: by the time of U.S. ratification, not a
single nation had filed a complaint against another signatory in this manner. See Quigley, supra note 9,
at 1294. The Covenant also provides an Optional Protocol whereby states may permit their citizens to
bring grievances related to Covenant rights directly to the Human Rights Committee. However, since
the United States chose not to ratify this Optional Protocol, individual Americans may not presently file
complaints directly before the committee. See id.
40. MULTILATERAL TREATiES, supra note 31, at 174.
41. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 1289.
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to languish for over a decade, the Senate again took up the issue in 1991, at
the urging of President George H.W. Bush.4" It ultimately consented to rati-
fication the following year,43 but it reserved a number of rights to the
United States and expressed a series of declarations and understandings
purporting to limit the Covenant's interpretation and application in this
country. 4
1. Scope of the Senate's Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
The United States has little company in the global community in
terms of the scope and severity of the RUDs it attached to the treaty.45
First, the Senate reserved to the United States the right to treat juveniles as
adults "in exceptional circumstances" despite contrary provisions of the
Covenant.46 The Senate also adopted a set of "understandings" and
"declarations" setting forth purported legal interpretations of obligations,
though not reserving specific rights as conditions of ratification.47 In the
most significant of them, the Senate specifically proclaimed that the provi-
sions of the Covenant guaranteeing human rights shall not be
42. Id. at 1289.
43. See id. at 1289-90.
44. See SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 102-23, at 22-23 (2d Sess. 1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 645.
45. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Initial Report of the United States ofAmerica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess.,
1401st mtg. at 9, para. 37, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/SR.1401 (1995) [hereinafter Consideration of
Reports].
46. SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 22. See also 138 CONG. REc., supra
note 15, at 4783. The Senate also attached four other unrelated reservations, of which two focused on
capital punishment. The United States reserved the right to impose capital punishment "on any person
(other than a pregnant woman)"; it further stipulated that the Covenant's provisions regarding "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" bound the United States only insofar as those
provisions correspond to existing constitutional provisions regarding cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
The United States also reserved the right to impose criminal penalties in force at the time the crime was
committed. The only other reservation prohibited implementation of any provision that would restrict
the constitutional right to free speech and association (for example, the Covenant's hate speech
provisions). 138 CONG. REC., supra note 15, at 4783.
47. In consenting to adopt this text as binding upon the United States, it is significant that the
Senate's RUD constituted an "understanding" as opposed to a "reservation." Conventionally in
international law, "understandings" are statements of "interpretation, clarification or elaboration
assumed to be consistent with the obligations of the treaty as submitted .... " Stefan A. Riesenfeld &
Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties,
67 CII.-KENT L. REv. 571, 585-86 (1991). Understandings do not modify the treaty's legal obligation.
A reservation, by contrast, is a "limitation, qualification, or contradiction of the obligations in a treaty."
Id. However, the Senate did not reserve to the United States a right to make it non-self-executing;
instead, the Senate simply announced that it understood the treaty to be non-self-executing. Thus, the
Senate's RUD did not limit the United States' obligation.
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self-executing.48 This limitation suggests that the treaty requires specific
implementing legislation to have domestic effect.4 9
2. International Criticism of the United States 'Approach to Covenant
Implementation
With so many limitations, the international community was quick to
criticize the United States. In 1995, the United States presented its initial
report to the Human Rights Committee pursuant to Covenant require-
ments." In meeting with the committee, Mr. Harper, an American delegate,
opined that the non-self-execution declaration meant that the Covenant did
not create private rights enforceable in United States courts, and that "both
the executive branch and the United States Senate were reluctant to use the
unicameral treaty power under the Constitution to introduce direct changes
in domestic law."'" Despite this reluctance, he assured the committee that
"implementation of the Covenant and the compatibility of future legislation
with it ... would be constantly reviewed."52
Despite these assurances, the committee strongly criticized the U.S.
ratification limitations in the meeting. 3 This criticism focused upon the
non-self-execution declaration. First, the committee believed that the non-
self-execution declaration was contrary to the purpose of the Covenant. 4
One member voiced fear that the United States did not have a "high degree
of commitment to changing domestic legislation if it conflicted with the
provisions of the Covenant... .,11 Second, the committee suggested that
the non-self-execution declaration could only apply if domestic laws
already existed to cover the provisions. 6 One member expressed concern,
stating that "it was unclear how Covenant fights would actually be
protected in cases where domestic law was not up to the standards set by
that instrument. 57
48. See SEN. COMas. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 23; 138 CONG. REc., supra note
15, at 4783
49. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 47, at 574. There is considerable scholarly disagreement
about whether the Senate possesses the power to attach such a limitation to a treaty. Some
commentators perceive the power as a corollary of the Senate's right to withhold consent. See id. at
618. Other commentators have sharply criticized this type of RUD by noting that it treads upon the
power of interpretation reserved to the judiciary and the power of execution reserved to the President.
See id. at 609-10.
50. See MICHAEL O'FLAHERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE U.N.: PRACTICE BEFORE TREATY
BODIES 44 (1996).
51. Consideration of Reports, supra note 45, at 4, para 12.
52. Id. at 5, para. 17. Harper's conspicuous choice of the passive voice highlights the uncertainty
ofjust who would be responsible for such acts of review.
53. See id. at 8-11, para. 34-48.
54. See id. at 11, para. 46.
55. Id, at 9, para. 38.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8, para. 34.
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On April 7, 1995, the committee issued official comments on the U.S.
report. 8 The committee decried the absence of information in the
report about the Covenant's implementation at the local and state level. 9 It
further criticized the United States for failing to adequately educate the
judiciary about the Covenant's obligations.60
3. Possible Motivations and Assumptions Underlying the Senate's RUDs
The Human Rights Committee's criticism recognized the contradic-
tion posed by the American RUDs: though the United States has formally
acknowledged the treaty's rights and obligated itself to enforce them at
home, it nevertheless used a declaration of non-self-execution to impede
the treaty's force domestically. A cynic might suspect that those behind
ratification wanted to claim the international prestige associated with the
Covenant without providing the reciprocal domestic action required by the
treaty.
There can be no question that issues of international reputation at least
partially motivated the Senate's decision to consent to ratification of the
Covenant. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations explicitly drew
attention to the anticipated effect of ratification abroad in its report on the
Covenant, noting:
In view of the leading role that the United States plays in the
international struggle for human rights, the absence of U.S.
ratification of the Covenant is conspicuous and, in the view of
many, hypocritical. The Committee believes that ratification will
remove doubts about the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to
human rights and strengthen the impact of U.S. efforts in the
human rights field.6
The report went on to state that ratification would enhance U.S. influence
over the development of democratic values in Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union, and countries in Africa and Asia.6 1 It also anticipated that
participation in the Human Rights Committee's oversight of party states
would permit the United States to "play a more aggressive role in the proc-
ess of enforcing compliance with the Covenant" by other nations.63
Although these interests undoubtedly played a significant role in
motivating ratification, reducing U.S. acceptance of the Covenant to mere
power politics in foreign affairs oversimplifies the contradictions posed by
the RUD package. Another major force motivating ratification and the
58. See Comments of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995).
59. See id. at 1.
60. See id. at 3.
61. SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 3.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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RUD package appears to have been the assumption by those involved in
ratification that the United States already adequately ensured almost all of
the human rights guaranteed by the Covenant.' The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee itself believed that Covenant rights were already pro-
tected in this country through the U.S. Constitution" and existing
domestic law.6 In addition, President Carter reportedly claimed that it was
"possible to read all the requirements contained in article 14 [regarding
juveniles] as consistent with United States law, policy and practice."67
Despite these beliefs, California's new juvenile transfer procedure
shows that constitutional protections correspond only imperfectly to
Covenant rights. Nothing in the U.S. Constitution protects juveniles in the
manner that the Covenant does. Indeed, the Senate even prefaced its RUD
pertaining to juvenile justice practices by claiming that "the policy and
practice of the United States are generally in compliance with.., the
Covenant's provisions regarding treatment of juveniles in the criminal
justice system."6 The presence of the word "generally" implicitly
acknowledges that some practices do not comply. Moreover, since the
United States has not yet ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child,69 the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is unique in the nation-
wide protection it offers to minors. In the few areas where the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee did recognize a divergence between U.S.
practice and Covenant obligations, it expressed optimism that the United
64. Id. at 2. ("The rights guaranteed by the Covenant are similar to those guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.").
65. Id. at 10. ("[T]he substantive provisions of the Covenant are consistent with the letter and
spirit of the United States Constitution .... ). Similarly, when the United States presented its first
mandatory report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee on the state of the Covenant's implementation,
the report noted that the U.S. Constitution already guarantees the most important rights and freedoms
necessary to a democratic society, and those constitutionally protected rights directly parallel the rights
addressed by the Covenant. Human Rights Committee Continues Examination of United States Report,
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., 1405th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. HR/CT/404 (Mar. 1995),
available at gopher:/lgopher.undp.org:70/00/uncurr/pressreleases/HRfCT/95-03/404 [hereinafter
Human Rights Committee Continues Examination].
66. SEN. CozN5. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 5. According to the committee, "[t]he
overwhelming majority of the provisions in the Covenant are compatible with existing U.S. domestic
law."
67. U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 26, at 113. President Carter was not alone in this optimistic
view of compliance. Some scholarly commentators at the time of ratification underestimated the
escalating trend in U.S. practice to try minors as adults without regard to age, in direct contravention of
the Covenant's requirement. See id. at 112 ("Paragraph 4 of Article 14 provides that, in the case of
juveniles, the procedure shall be such as to take into account their age and the desirability of promoting
their rehabilitation. These directives are clearly consistent with the objectives of our juvenile courts and
related systems."). Such commentators seemed to be unaware of the nationwide practice of denying
jurisdiction to juvenile courts in favor of mandatory trial as an adult.
68. 138 CONG. REc., supra note 15, at 4783.
69. See Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 11, 27 n.55
(2000); see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 144 U.N.T.S. 123, 28 I.L.M.
1448 (1989).
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States would spontaneously move toward compliance with international
standards through its own legislative process, making domestic enforce-
ment of the Covenant largely unnecessary." Unfortunately, the commit-
tee's optimistic view of the future never came to pass. As the following
section will demonstrate, state laws like California's Proposition 21 violate
the Covenant.
C. Promises Broken: California's Proposition 21 as an Illustration of
Noncompliance with the Nation's Treaty Obligation
Implementation and enforcement of the nation's obligations under the
Covenant only become significant if the nation is actually violating the
treaty's provisions. Although the Constitution does not provide the same
protections as the Covenant, that fact alone does not establish noncompli-
ance with the treaty. This Part juxtaposes the Covenant's requirements
regarding the prosecution of juveniles with California's specific practices
in that area to evaluate the breach in compliance. It examines the recent
reforms in California in detail and concludes that these reforms violate the
treaty's terms and exceed the scope of the Senate's RUDs.
1. Covenant Provisions Regarding the Criminal Prosecution of Juveniles
The Covenant imposes substantive obligations on party states regard-
ing the prosecution of minors during criminal proceedings. In general, it
obligates states to take account of a child's age in legal proceedings. At the
pretrial level, states must separate accused juveniles from adults and adju-
dicate their cases as quickly as possible.7 ' During trial, the Covenant
requires that "[i]n the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such
as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their
rehabilitation."72 Upon conviction, states must segregate minors from
adults and afford "treatment appropriate to their age and legal status. 73
The document further promises that "[e]very child shall have... the right
to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on
the part of his family, society and the State."'74
70. See SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 4. The committee stated:
In areas such as these, it may be appropriate and necessary to question whether changes in
U.S. law should be made to bring the United States into full compliance at the international
level. However, the Committee anticipates that changes in U.S. law in these areas will occur
through the normal legislative process.
Id.
71. See Covenant, supra note 1, at art. 10, para. 2(b), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("Accused juvenile
persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication.").
72. Id. art. 14, para. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
73. Id. art. 10, para. 3, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
74. Id. art. 24, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
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2. Practices in California Regarding the Criminal Prosecution of Minors
Though the Human Rights Committee's enforcement mechanisms
have never been brought to bear on the United States, the procedural guar-
antees envisioned by the Covenant for minors differ radically from current
practice in California. As the following passages will illustrate, instead of
moving toward compliance with the Covenant in recent years, California
has moved in the opposite direction. Further, given that California's juve-
nile justice practices are similar to those of other states in the Union, such
noncompliance is a problem of national dimension.
Although the juvenile court systems in the United States traditionally
emphasized the importance of special treatment for juveniles, 75 by the
1990s virtually every state had enacted statutes permitting trial of juveniles
as adults.76 Such legislation typically included laws lowering the minimum
age at which a minor can be tried as an adult, the creation of expansive lists
of crimes requiring automatic prosecution in adult court, and increasing
reliance upon prosecutorial discretion to determine whether to try minors
as adults.77 California's Proposition 21 included all three laws.78
Trying minors as adults is not new, in itself. Almost as long as there
have been juvenile courts, there have been cases in which judges felt they
could only serve justice by relinquishing jurisdiction over the minor to an
adult criminal court.79 Virtually every state allows juvenile court judges to
waive jurisdiction over certain minors to adult criminal court.8" Until 2000,
however, judicial waiver was the only procedural avenue by which a minor
could be tried as an adult in California.1
In California prior to the year 2000, minors could not be tried in adult
court without first undergoing a hearing in juvenile court.8 2 This right to a
75. See Child or Adult, supra note 18.
76. Id.; see also Juszkiewicz, supra note 18.
77. Juszkiewicz, supra note 18.
78. See ifia text accompanying notes 96-102.
79. For an extensive history of the development of transfer mechanisms, see David S. Tanenhaus,
The Evolution of Transfer out of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
13, supra note 22, at 13-43.
80. Dawson, supra note 22, at 45.
81. Manduley v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140, 145 (Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 106
Cal. Rptr. 2d 269 (Cal. 2001) (holding that Proposition 21 violates the state constitution). The
California Supreme Court has agreed to review Manduley's holding regarding the constitutionality of
Proposition 21. In addition to ruling on the state law question, however, the Manduley court also
conducted a historical analysis of the treatment of juveniles in California prior to the new law, and
pointed out how the new law changed court procedure. This historical and procedural analysis is not at
issue in the state supreme court's pending review of the case, and thus remains instructive as a way to
understand the evolution of the present circumstances.
82. Id. at 145. The only exception to this rule was for a very small group of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds. The law required prosecutors to file mandatory charges directly in adult court if
the minor "(1) had been declared a ward of the court for prior felonies committed after he was 14
and (2) the new charge alleged he committed one or more of a list of serious offenses ....
Additionally, if a juvenile had previously been (1) convicted in adult court... or (2) found unfit
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hearing in juvenile court existed irrespective of the severity of the minor's
alleged crime.83 Further, the decision-making process in the transfer hear-
ing "began with an assessment of the age of the offender and the charged
offense."84 For instance, adolescents who were at least sixteen years old
and had committed one of a specified list of violent crimes could enter the
adult criminal system only after a judge found the juvenile was not fit for
treatment by the juvenile court in such a hearing. 5 Thus California proce-
dure took account of the minor's age as an intrinsic part of the hearing pro-
cess.
Fitness hearings in California followed the traditional, nationwide
model: judges considered the child's personal, social, and family situation,
together with the severity of the crime, to conclude whether he or she
belonged in the juvenile system. The specific criteria judges considered
during this mandatory hearing included: (1) the degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor; (2) whether the minor could be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion; (3) the minor's previous delinquent history; (4) the success of pre-
vious attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor; and (5) the
circumstances and gravity of the alleged offense.86
The factors considered during the initial fitness hearing in California
thus put substantial emphasis on the minor's unique situation, character,
based on his prior delinquent history..I.. Id. at 145 n.2. Thus, once a juvenile was found unfit and
convicted in adult court, future charges could be filed against him directly in adult court again without a
fresh hearing in juvenile court.
83. Id. at 145.
84. Id. at 144.
85. Id. at 144-45. For the most severe crimes, this method of transfer following a judicial hearing
could encompass even some fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds. See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE
BAR, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 1030 (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter CEB].
86. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (Deering 2000). The factors used in fitness hearings
in California track those that the U.S. Supreme Court approved in 1966 in Kent v. United States. 383
U.S. 541, 553-67 (1966). The controversy in Kent involved a minor whose attorney moved for the
juvenile court to grant him access to the minor's Social Service file relating to his probation period. The
file's contents were vital to the minor's defense against transfer to adult court, since the juvenile court
would consider them in determining the outcome of a fitness hearing. Id. at 545-46. The judge refused
to rule on the motion or to hold a fitness hearing. He simply waived jurisdiction over the youth,
transferring him summarily to the adult system. Id. at 546. In the order, the judge made no findings and
recited no specific reason for the waiver. Id. Since the statute provided for a hearing, the Supreme
Court found the judge's conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant vacating the adult court's conviction
of the minor and remanded the case for a de novo review of the juvenile's fitness for the juvenile
system. Id. at 564.
Although the Kent Court found that the Constitution does not require fitness hearings for juveniles
facing transfer to adult court, it held that if a state guarantees such a hearing by statute, then the transfer
process must adhere to "the basic requirements of due process and fairness." Id. at 553. Further, where
the statute promised meaningful review, the minor had a right to a full investigation and accounting of
reasons. Id. at 561. The Court attached an appendix of factors used in the District of Columbia to
evaluate whether to transfer minors out ofjuvenile court. Id. at 566-67. A majority of state legislatures
responded by incorporating these factors directly into their transfer laws. Tanenhaus, supra note 79, at
32.
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age, and amenability to rehabilitation. By requiring consideration of these
factors, the hearings on their face satisfied the Covenant's command
regarding juvenile trial procedures. However, this situation changed radi-
cally in 2000 as two new provisions took effect in the state.87
a. First Steps away from Taking Account of Juveniles 'Age: California's
Expansion ofAutomatic Transfer to Adult Court
On January 1, 2000, Senate Bill 334 took effect in California and
dramatically altered the means by which juveniles could become subject to
adult criminal procedure and penalties. If a youth is at least sixteen years
old, has a prior felony record, and commits a specified violent offense, then
the legislation requires that the youth be tried as an adult.88 Thus, the trans-
fer mechanism is automatic and does not involve a fitness hearing: the
prosecutor files charges directly in adult criminal court, bypassing the
juvenile system altogether.89 As a safety valve to protect minors, the legis-
lation creates a new "reverse remand" procedure whereby the defendant is
entitled to a postconviction hearing in adult court if, and only if, the court
convicts him or her of a lesser charge for which the mandatory, direct-
filing in adult court would not have been available.9" In other words, if
convicted of something less than SB 334's enumerated list of violent
offenses, the minor has a right to a hearing to consider remanding the case
back to the juvenile court's jurisdiction.91 However, cases involving multi-
ple charges against the juvenile illustrate that this "reverse remand" right is
narrow: conviction of only one charge subject to SB 334's mandatory
adult prosecution eliminates the right to a postconviction hearing regarding
the other charges. 92 Further, if the transfer to adult court is outside SB
334's ambit and made pursuant to a fitness hearing for a nonenumerated
crime, there is also no such right.93
87. California was largely behind the curve of the rest of the nation with these changes. One
recent nationwide study suggests that in a six-month statistical sample period in 1998, eighty-five
percent of determinations whether to charge a juvenile as an adult were not made by judges.
Juszkiewicz, supra note 18. The data suggest that long before Proposition 21 passed in California,
judicial waiver hearings in the rest of the country in juvenile court had already become a relatively rare
luxury for minors facing trial in the adult criminal system. But cf Dawson, supra note 22, at 46 (citing
a 1995 estimate by the U.S. General Accounting Office finding that more minors were transferred to
adult court following judicial waiver than by other transfer methods, but noting the estimate excluded
key data and may be outdated).
88. CEB, supra note 85, at 1031.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1031-32.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1031.
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b. Second Steps away from Taking Account of Juveniles'
Age: Proposition 21 's Procedural Upheaval
In early 2000, the voters of California passed Proposition 21, "The
Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act."94 The law went into
effect on March 8, 2000,"5 significantly redefining transfer procedure, just
three months after SB 334's changes. The Proposition's main legacy was a
new, three-tiered system of juvenile transfer: (1) mandatory transfer for
the most serious offenses, (2) optional transfer at the prosecutor's discre-
tion for a long list of moderately serious offenses, and (3) traditional judi-
cial waiver through fitness proceedings for everything else. In the first tier,
the new law mandated automatic, direct filing of charges in adult court for
anyone fourteen years or older accused of so-called "one-strike" violent
sex offenses or first-degree murder with one or more special circum-
stances.96
This new three-tiered system drastically altered existing court proce-
dures. The first tier of Proposition 21 expanded SB 334's "mandatory
direct file" method to include fourteen-and fifteen-year-olds. In the second
tier, Proposition 21 created a new transfer procedure previously untried in
California, although at least fifteen other states already had similar laws.97
This new procedure gave prosecutors the discretion to file directly in adult
court for defendants at least sixteen years of age accused of a wide range of
94. As Governor Wilson's pet initiative, Proposition 21's campaign benefited from massive
corporate sponsorship at a time when many thought Wilson was a viable presidential contender. See
Huffington, supra note 17. Voters responded to the cash-infused advertising blitz, approving the ballot
measure by a wide margin. However, there is evidence to suggest voters misperceived the new law's
ability to reduce crime. Other states using similar procedures to transfer minors to adult court have
shown no appreciable increase in deterrence and crime prevention. In fact, one study suggests that
available empirical evidence shows that "recidivism rates are much higher among juveniles transferred
to [adult] criminal court than among those retained in the juvenile justice system." Redding & Howell,
supra note 22, at 150. A second study by the Office of the Surgeon General, released January 17, 2001,
concluded that the notion that "[g]etting tough with juvenile offenders by trying them in adult criminal
courts reduces the likelihood they will commit more crimes" is simply "a myth." OFFcIE OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/summary.htm. The Surgeon General's study
focused on the scope of youth violence, its causes and how to prevent it. Id.
95. See CEB, supra note 85, at 1031.
96. To charge the minor directly in adult court for murder, the prosecutor must allege one of the
twenty-two possible enhancements enumerated in California Penal Code § 190.2(a) (for example, a
prior murder conviction, use of a destructive device such as a bomb, killing a police officer, lying in
wait, and extreme depravity). CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(b) (Deering Supp. 2001). Similarly, to
charge the minor for a "one-strike" sexual offense in adult court, the prosecutor must also allege the
crime was committed under one of the circumstances listed in Penal Code § 667.61, including inter alia
having a past conviction of a similar offense, engaging in a specified element (kidnapping, burglary,
use of a dangerous weapon, tying the victim), or administering a controlled substance during the
alleged offense. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(b) (Deering Supp. 2001). If such a circumstance is
alleged, the list of sex crimes for which a minor can be tried in adult court includes rape, forcible sex
offenses, forcible lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, and similar acts. Id.
97. Dawson, supra note 22, at 49.
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offenses.9 In the third transfer tier, judicial waiver hearings remained
available to juveniles who were either (a) accused of offenses which fall
outside those enumerated in tiers one and two, or (b) too young to meet
the requirements of tiers one or two.99 However, depending on the offense,
Proposition 21 sometimes imposed a presumption of unfitness that favored
waiver to adult court or a presumption of fitness that favored retention of
juvenile jurisdiction.'
Although the first tier (mandatory, direct filing of charges in adult
court) and the third tier (nonenumerated offenses still under the old system
of juvenile fitness hearings) appear stable in their application, the second
tier of Proposition 21 has become a moving target in light of recent court
challenges. For instance, scarcely a year after the new law took effect, the
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held in Manduley v.
Superior Court that Proposition 21 violated state constitutional separation-
of-powers doctrine by vesting prosecutors with the discretion to file
charges in adult court. °l Thus, the ruling struck down the provision of
Proposition 21 enabling prosecutors to file charges in adult court as a mat-
ter of discretion. The ruling, however, did not affect tier one of the
Proposition, which requires mandatory transfer to adult court for the most
serious offenses.102
The impact that the Manduley decision will have on the state is diffi-
cult to predict. Four months after the ruling, California's Fifth District
Court of Appeal issued a contradictory opinion, disagreeing sharply with
the Manduley majority.0" In Bravo v. Superior Court, the Fifth District
upheld Proposition 21 on the very grounds that the Manduley court had
used to overrule it." The California Supreme Court has already agreed to
settle this split in the districts by reviewing the Proposition.05
98. See CEB, supra note 85, at 1031.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269 (Cal.
2001). In Manduley, a juvenile defendant challenged the prosecution's use of Proposition 21's
discretionary transfer provision. By charging the youth in adult court, the prosecution was able to
ensure a much longer sentence. The state constitution, however, vests discretion over sentencing
exclusively in the judicial branch. The court found that selection of the forum in which the youth was
tried was an impermissible exercise of discretion over sentencing by the prosecutor, and hence, by the
executive branch. Since transfer decisions directly affect sentencing options and duration, only judges
may make them. Id. at 142, 146-52.
102. Id. at 152.
103. Bravo v. Super. Ct., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding Proposition 21 does
not violate state constitutional provisions).
104. Id. at 517-23.
105. See Alex Roth, Youth-CrimeLiv Goes to High Court, SAN DIEGO UNION-TuBUNE, June 28,
2001, at B4. See also Shannon Lafferty, The Jury's Still Out on Juvie Crime Measure, THE RECORDER,
April 27, 2001.
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Nevertheless, even a ruling by the state supreme court may not be the
final word in this highly contentious matter. In a strongly worded dissent,
Judge Nares warned,
The people of this state are constitutionally permitted to completely
eliminate availability of the juvenile system for certain
juveniles .... [If] the people are not allowed to delegate such
limited discretion to prosecutors, the people of this state may well
decide that their only recourse is to include all serious and violent
crimes in the mandatory direct file system or eliminate the juvenile
system as a whole.10 6
California voters thus might respond to the judicial branch's gutting of
Proposition 21 with an even harsher initiative if the courts rely solely on
state legal grounds to strike down the law. This situation illustrates the
potentially significant impact of the Covenant on state law: namely, it
could limit state voters' ability to pass juvenile justice reform laws by pre-
empting such laws via the Supremacy Clause. However, before considering
whether the Covenant is enforceable by the state judiciary, it is first neces-
sary to consider whether Proposition 21 in fact constitutes a violation of the
Covenant.
3. Proposition 21 's Provisions and the Scope of the Senate's
"Exceptional Circumstances " Reservation
The Senate addressed juvenile justice practices in the United States in
its fifth reservation to the treaty ("fifth reservation"). It prefaced the reser-
vation by claiming "the policy and practice of the United States are
generally in compliance with ... the Covenant's provisions regarding
treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system."' 17 It next reserved to
the United States the right "in exceptional circumstances, to treat juveniles
as adults, notwithstanding [the relevant provisions of the Covenant]."'0 8
The reservation also permits housing juveniles with adults in prison in
"exceptional circumstances."'0 9 Thus, in order for the treaty to have any
effect whatsoever on California's Proposition 21, the state law must exceed
the scope of the Senate's reservation."0 In other words, the state must
transfer juveniles to adult court in cases beyond the contemplated
''exceptional circumstances."
The text of the reservation provides no guidance as to what constitutes
an "exceptional circumstance" meriting treatment of a juvenile as an adult
in contravention of the Covenant obligation. One might be tempted to infer
106. Manduley, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158 (Nares, J., dissenting).
107. 138 CONG. REc., supra note 15, at 4783.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. For an explanation on why reservations are binding, see supra note 47.
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that because the reservation defines such contravention of the juvenile's
rights as a departure from general practice, it must, by definition, be
"exceptional." This sort of bootstrapping would enable the United States
glibly to disregard its Covenant obligations with respect to minors in
criminal proceedings at will. Such a reading, however, neither conforms to
the Covenant's language nor to its ratification history.
First, the observation regarding U.S. practice "generally" complying
is not connected by any word suggesting that this observation itself justi-
fies the reservation. In fact, the reservation begins with the word
"nevertheless," defined as synonymous with "however. ' l. This suggests a
statement in opposition to that which precedes it. The "general" compli-
ance stands in opposition to the "exceptional circumstance," and thus can-
not textually serve to delimit the scope of such circumstances. Something
more is required.
The ratification history in the Senate hints that "exceptional
circumstances" may perhaps be defined by the juvenile's criminal history
and the nature of the offense. When the Bush administration proposed res-
ervation language pertaining to the housing of juveniles with adults, it
stated that "there are instances in which juveniles are not separated from
adults, for example because of the juvenile's criminal history or the nature
of the offense." ' Elsewhere in the proposal, the administration reiterated
these same examples, stating that "it is important that flexibility remain to
address exceptional circumstances in which trial or incarceration of
juveniles as adults is appropriate: for example, trial of certain juveniles as
adults based on their criminal histories or the nature of their
offenses ... .""' Although the Senate never adopted this language, these
proposals do provide a clue to the Bush Administration's view of the
meaning of "exceptional circumstances." Unfortunately, the Senate pro-
vided no guidance of its own during the ratification debates to convey the
intended meaning or scope of this language. Given the complete absence of
standards to govern "exceptionality" in this context, the Senate appears to
have left the door open for individual state courts to interpret the phrase in
ways consistent with their own penal codes.
If a juvenile's criminal history and the severity of the juvenile's
offense delineate the boundary between exceptional and unexceptional cir-
cumstances, it is still unclear where to draw the line. For instance, in the
case of Proposition 21, it is not clear under the Covenant reservation how
much criminal history a minor must have before she may be transferred out
of the juvenile system, or how severe a crime must be to constitute an
"exceptional circumstance." Proposition 21 created a laundry list of crimes
11I. See AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 839 (2d college ed. 1985).
112. SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 7.
113. Id. at 13.
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that qualified for either mandatory or discretionary filing of charges in
adult court for youths fourteen and older. The list did not merely include
extremely violent conduct, such as murder, assault with a deadly weapon,
rape, and kidnapping; it also included crimes such as unarmed robbery,
drug sale,"4 and burglary."5 In addition, it permitted transfer to adult
criminal court at the prosecutor's discretion for fourteen- and fifteen-year-
olds whenever the minor had prior felony juvenile convictions, used a fire-
arm, or was subject to a list of other special circumstances, including
broadly defined gang affiliation." 6
Arguably, these transfer provisions exceed the scope of the
"exceptional circumstances" reserved by the Senate. Though one might
contend that some of the enumerated crimes might, indeed, be exceptional,
it seems unreasonable to claim that they all are. The inclusion of some
nonviolent offenses, and the reliance upon nonviolent prior felonies as a
circumstance sufficient to trigger transfer, certainly appears to exceed the
scope of the U.S. reservation. Though there is no clear, bright-line rule to
define just how "exceptional" the child's circumstances must be to qualify
under the reservation, wholesale classification of thousands of youthful
offenders would render the reservation almost meaningless in its overinclu-
siveness. 117
Ironically, some of the language in Proposition 21 itself provides sup-
port for a narrow definition of "exceptional circumstances" in the context
of California law. The first tier of Proposition 21 established a schema for
mandatory trial of minors in adult court where the youth is charged with
first-degree murder enhanced with "special circumstances." This type of
crime clearly seems to be of the sort President Bush referred to during the
ratification process. Such crimes fall at the extreme side of the spectrum in
the California penal scheme; indeed, the crime can be so outrageous that it
is punishable by death. In addition, the language of the reservation echoes
the penal code ("special circumstances") so closely that in the absence of
other compelling interpretive authority, there is little room to argue a dis-
crepancy. Other states may have different language in their penal codes
regarding these sorts of "special circumstances." State variation in this con-
text highlights the manner in which the Senate reservation can be adapted
to fit a state's particularized framework. This example illustrates such a fit
114. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b)-(d) (Deering Supp. 2001).
115. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1203.09 (Deering Supp. 2001).
116. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(d)(2) (Deering Supp. 2001). This discretionary transfer,
however, is very much in flux and may not have survived the Manduley ruling in the Court of Appeals.
See supra text accompanying notes 10 1-106.
117. The Senate clearly did not intend to include all juvenile offenders under the reservation's
ambit (thus the requirement of exceptionality). If exceptionality could expand to include nonviolent,
minor offenses, it could then theoretically expand to encompass any crime at all-effectively emptying
the reservation of all meaning. Any logical reading thus must begin by recognizing that the
exceptionality provision must provide a meaningful, objective limit.
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appropriate to California. Other states naturally would have to construe
"exceptional circumstances" in light of their own penal codes. Without
guidance from the Senate, a patchwork of fifty state-specific
interpretations of the reservation can bring states into compliance using
local structures and interpretive models.
Given the above, it seems that some of the felonies enumerated in
Proposition 21 appear to fall outside the fifth reservation's boundary,
whereas "special circumstance" murder clearly falls within it. However, it
is unclear whether some of the enumerated violent crimes that fall short of
special circumstance murder are encompassed by the reservation. Without
any more guidance from the Senate, there is no reason to assume that the
reservation necessarily extends much beyond "special circumstance" mur-
der in California, though the possibility of defining it certainly remains
open to reasonable state interpretation. However, for individual judges to
make such determinations, they must have authority to rule on the treaty
provisions.
By exceeding the scope of the Senate's "exceptional circumstance"
reservation, transfer provisions like those in Proposition 21 and similar
laws in other states put the United States in breach of its Covenant obliga-
tion. The next Part of this Comment explores potential solutions to this
problem, considering both state and federal enforcement avenues.
II
STATE AND FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT AS
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO NONCOMPLIANCE
Given that the Covenant affords rights that are secured nowhere else
in American law, the question of the treaty's enforceability looms large. To
suggest that states like California are enacting laws that violate the
Covenant's human rights provisions and that there is no remedy to the
situation would imply that the United States' ratification of the treaty was a
mere ruse and that there was never any real obligation undertaken." 8 A
more reasonable view of the Senate's motives requires a reading of the
118. U.S. conduct subsequent to ratification contradicts this view. For instance, six years after the
Covenant went into effect, President Clinton issued an executive order requiring the agencies of the
executive branch to implement the Covenant and other human rights treaty obligations "that fall within
[their] areas of responsibility ... " Exec. Order No. 13107, 3 C.F.R. 13,107 (1998), available at
http:lvww.access.gpo.govlnaralcfrlwaisidx_99/exec_99.html. However, this order had virtually no
practical effect upon violative state laws. Without congressional legislation to create a specific legal
framework to implement the rights, the executive agencies have had little incentive to enforce them.
Furthermore, violative state laws are generally outside the purview of those agencies. Implicitly
recognizing this, the executive order merely instituted an Interagency Working Group to develop
"proposals and mechanisms for improving the monitoring of the actions by the various States... for
their conformity with [the Covenant]." Id. This Working Group served a purely advisory capacity and
lacked any authority to correct the state laws found to breach the treaty. See als, infra text
accompanying notes 227-232.
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RUDs that enables some remedy to bring noncomplying laws into accord
with the international obligation. Such a reading would both respect the
RUDs and still give force to the treaty.
Any force that the treaty might have derives from the President's for-
eign-affairs power under Article II of the Constitution. This Comment thus
begins the enforcement analysis by considering the interplay between that
foreign-affairs power and federalism concerns when that power intrudes on
areas of law otherwise reserved to the states. It argues that federalism prin-
ciples pose no obstacle to the treaty-making power and that the federal
government has full constitutional authority to bind states in such areas
using a treaty. Thus, the fact that juvenile justice decisions are normally
made locally by state governments does not limit the President's ability to
ratify a treaty like the Covenant.
In Part II.B, the Comment considers the capacity of both state and
federal judiciaries to enforce the treaty in the absence of national imple-
menting legislation. At the state level, the Comment turns to the impact on
treaty enforcement of the Senate's declaration of non-self-execution. It
considers examples of erroneous state court decisions holding that non-
self-executing treaties have no effect whatsoever upon state laws and
argues that state courts must enforce non-self-executing treaties under the
Supremacy Clause. Finally, this Comment considers the separate problem
of enforcement in federal courts, surveying the Covenant's implications on
habeas petitions, as well as other controversies.
A. The Interaction Between Federalism Concerns and Treaty
Obligations
Treaty enforcement in American courts presents special difficulties,
particularly when the treaty conflicts with the will of a state legislature or
the vast majority of voters in a given state. Because the Covenant's provi-
sions affect issues of state law, they raise federalism and Tenth
Amendment concerns.
1. Federalism Concerns and the Limits of the Federal Government's
Treaty-Making Power
Criminal law has long been regarded as an area reserved by the Tenth
Amendment to the states." 9 As a threshold matter, one must ask whether
the Covenant's intrusion on an area of law reserved to the states invalidates
the treaty entirely. Some scholars argue that the federal government has no
right to impinge upon state criminal laws with its treaty-making power. 20
119. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) ("Under our federal system,
the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."') (citing Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982))).
120. See generally Bradley, supra note 10.
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Nothing in the Constitution, however, suggests this proposition is true: the
Constitution vests in the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, the power "to make Treaties."'' It does not limit that power only to
the making of treaties which do not affect rights reserved to the states.
Such a limitation would make it nearly impossible to conduct the nation's
foreign affairs because treaties frequently affect areas of state concern.
Longstanding Supreme Court doctrine holds that there is virtually no
limit to the use of the treaty-making power to affect matters otherwise out-
side the federal government's purview. In 1920, the Court held that a treaty
may make binding law in areas otherwise reserved to the several states.'2
As long as the treaty is valid and constitutional, the foreign-affairs power
trumps local legislation." Under this precedent and its progeny, 24 there
can be no Tenth Amendment dispute about the extent of the federal gov-
ernment's foreign-affairs power, for treaty-making is immune from feder-
alism limitations.1 25
2. Federalism R UDs' Minimal Impact upon the Nation's Obligation to
Enforce the Covenant
Although the Constitution permits the federal government to make
treaties that bind the States, the Senate adopted a special RUD pertaining to
the roles of federal and state governments in the implementation of the
Covenant. The Senate's RUD stipulates that the federal government will
only implement the Covenant "to the extent that it exercises legislative and
judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the
state and local governments ....
121. U.S. CoNs. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2.
122. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,434-35 (1920).
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). However, some
commentators claim the force of Missouri v. Holland has weakened in the intervening years. See, e.g.,
Bradley, supra note 10, at 391 ("For a variety of reasons... the distinction between domestic and
foreign affairs has been eroding in recent years, and this trend is likely to continue. As a result, there
will be an increasing need to reexamine the differential treatment of federal foreign affairs powers.").
This claim is based primarily on a policy argument, rather than on superseding precedent. The Supreme
Court has given no indication that it intends to soften its position. In fact, Bradley himself admits that
his position would require explicitly overruling Missouri v. Holland. See id. at 394-95.
125. Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing"
and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 515, 530 (1991). Damrosch contends:
By virtue of both the authoritative decision of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland and
the rejection of... attempts to reverse that decision.., our constitutional law is clear: the
treaty-makers may make supreme law binding on the states as to any subject, and notions of
states' rights should not be asserted as impediments to the full implementation of treaty
obligations.
Id. But cf Bradley, supra note 10, at 394-95, 460 (arguing that upholding the principle of federalism
requires doing away with the current distinction between foreign affairs and domestic affairs powers,
but conceding that this approach "would involve overruling some of the reasoning in Holland).
126. 138 CONG. Rc., supra note 15, at 4783.
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The Bush administration proposed this "federalism RUD" in order to
"[clarify] the degree to which the federal government is obliged to ensure
compliance with the Covenant by state and local entities."' 7 It thus seems
likely that the federalism RUD arose out of a deliberate executive effort to
defer to states' local legislation and judicial jurisdiction.' Instead of
implementing the treaty fully and homogeneously throughout the nation,
by adopting the administration's proposal the Senate explicitly granted
states flexibility in deciding for themselves how best to achieve the
Covenant's mandate.
Moreover, the U.S. report to the Human Rights Committee promised
that the federalism RUD "was not a reservation and did not modify or limit
the United States' obligations under the Covenant."'29 Thus, since the
Covenant obligates party states to enforce the promised rights, the federal-
ism RUD does nothing to diminish that obligation. The view that the feder-
alism RUD does nothing to diminish the United States' obligations under
the Covenant is supported by the past experience of another party state that
included a federalism RUD with its ratification of the Covenant. In 1980,
Australia made a reservation in relation to its own federal system. 3 ' It
withdrew the reservation four years later,'3 ' however, after the Netherlands
issued a statement of concern about it.3 The statement indicated that such
a reservation would only be acceptable "if it does not impair the obligation
to implement the Covenant in all the component parts of the State."'3 This
objection stemmed from the Covenant's requirement that the obligation
"shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or
exceptions,"' 13 4 and the corresponding belief that "federal reservations are
contrary to ... the object and purpose of the Covenant."' 35 The Bush
administration was aware of the international controversy over Australia's
reservation, and expressly chose to avoid purporting to modify or limit the
United States' obligation in this regard because such a reservation might be
internationally "contentious."' 36 Reading the Senate's "federalism RUD"
together with the absence of congressional implementing legislation, one
127. SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44 at 9.
128. In fact, the Bush administration explained that the federalism RUD "signal[s] ... that the
Federal Government will remove any Federal inhibition to the States' abilities to meet their
obligations." SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 19.
129. Human Rights Committee Continues Examination, supra note 65, at 2.
130. LIESBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY AND RUIN?
200 (1995).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 224. The Covenant's enforcement mechanism contains a provision whereby party states
may voice their concerns about treaty compliance by other party states. Covenant, supra note I, at art.
41, 999 U.N.T.S. at 182.
133. LIJNZAAD, supra note 130, at 224.
134. Covenant, supra note 1, at art. 50, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185.
135. LIJNZAAD, supra note 130, at 194.
136. SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 44, at 19.
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can reasonably conclude that rather than choosing deliberately to ignore the
treaty it had just ratified, the Senate was instead displacing the burden of
treaty enforcement onto the states, providing them with an opportunity to
devise their own unique implementation schema.
3. Possible Limits to Congress's Power to Implement the Covenant
Senator Helms attached a proviso to the Senate's approval at the end
of the Covenant's ratification session that may have deterred congressional
action. The proviso was a purely domestic statement that was not transmit-
ted to the United Nations: "Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes
legislation, or other action ... prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States as interpreted by the United States."'37 Combined with the federal-
ism understanding, this proviso arguably worked to deter federal imple-
menting legislation.'38 Thus, without state or federal judicial intervention,
and without passage of relevant state legislation, the guarantee of many of
the Covenant's rights evaporated as a practical matter.'39
Despite its practical effects, it is significant that Helms's proviso was
not transmitted to the United Nations. The Netherlands' public response to
Australia's attempted reservation suggests one possible reason the Senate
chose not to transmit the Helms proviso to the U.N. along with the rest of
the ratification RUDs. Not telling the world of this intent foreclosed criti-
cism in the international spotlight. However, it also foreclosed any claim to
the proviso's validity under international law.14
Neither principles of federalism nor the Helms proviso pose any
obstacle to enforcement of Covenant rights. Well-established constitutional
precedent confirms that treaties such as this can reach into areas of law
otherwise reserved to the states despite possible limits to congressional
power in those areas. The next Part explores both state and federal
enforcement possibilities, and the impact of non-self-execution upon each
of them.
137. 138 CONG. RFc., supra note 15, at 4784.
138. A question thus arises whether the federal government can even pass national implementing
legislation for the rights promised in a treaty. Unlike the foreign-affairs power, the power to pass
domestic legislation has clear limits because the Constitution only vests Congress with authority to pass
legislation in a narrow, enumerated set of circumstances. LUINZAAD, supra note 130, at 224. If those
promised rights are outside Congress's sphere of authority and intrude into matters reserved to local
governance, Congress may have no constitutional authority to implement them.
On the other hand, since implementation is necessary to carry out an obligation under an
enumerated federal power, the Necessary and Proper Clause may authorize congressional action in this
area, despite the federalism RUD. The foreign-affairs power is clearly a power "vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States" and implementation of the treaty provisions thus
would be "necessary and proper for carrying [it] into Execution." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
139. Given the possibility of using the Necessary and Proper Clause to invoke federal authority to
pass implementing legislation, it is unclear what Helms intended. Perhaps the proviso was a warning to
Helms's colleagues not to submit any bills attempting to give force to the Covenant's rights.
140. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 1307.
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B. Paths to Judicial Enforcement of the Covenant in the Absence of
Implementing Legislation
Judicial authority to enforce treaty provisions turns upon whether
treaty rights are justiciable given the absence of implementing legislation.
This question requires a close look at self-execution doctrine at both the
state and federal levels, and the crucial differences between those levels.
1. Enforcement of Non-Self-Executing Treaties by State Courts
Upon ratification, the Covenant ostensibly became "the supreme Law
of the Land" with respect to the several states. 14' There is considerable
scholarly disagreement, however, about the specific effect of a non-self-
executing treaty that lacks implementing legislation. Disagreements
abound as to whether non-self-execution means a treaty has no domestic
effect at all, limited domestic effect in certain areas, or no relevance at all
for the question of domestic effect.
Professor Carlos Vazquez claims the treaty automatically has the
status of national, federal law, no matter what the Senate intended with its
RUDs. Making primarily a textual argument, Professor Vazquez argues,
"The Supremacy Clause provides that 'all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.' No interpretation is necessary to conclude that this clause
purports to give 'all' treaties the status of domestic law."'4 He contends
that an interpretation of non-self-execution which required implementing
legislation before a treaty could be given force under the Supremacy
Clause would "have the unfortunate effect of reading the reference to
treaties entirely out of [that clause]."'43 By relying on the Supremacy
Clause, Professor Vasquez argues implicitly for national implementation of
treaties.
While the text of the Supremacy Clause directs its command exclu-
sively to the relationship between federal law and state law, putting federal
laws and treaties above state laws, nothing in the clause supports an argu-
ment for enforceability of treaties solely at the national level.'" Professor
John Yoo marshals historical evidence from the Framing period to support
the view that the Supremacy Clause regulates only the relationship between
state law and federal law, rather than regulating the relationship between
treaties and federal courts. Professor Yoo cites Albert Gallatin's speech
during the 1796 Jay Treaty debates, which argued that the Supremacy
141. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
142. Vazquez, supra note 13, at 2169.
143. Id. at2171.
144. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 12, at 2249-50 ("While the Clause does
declare the supremacy of federal law over state law, it does not alter the existing relationships between
different types of federal law and their methods of enforcement.").
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Clause "only compares all the acts of the Federal government with the acts
of the individual States, and declares that either of the first, whether under
the name of Constitution, law, or Treaty, shall be paramount to and
supersede the Constitution and laws of the individual States.""14
Professor Yoo's reading of the Constitution's text and structure, when
combined with his historical analysis, leads him to conclude that non-self-
executing treaties lack federal force entirely.'46 He makes an argument that
focuses on the Constitution's structure: looking at the allocation of power
between the executive's power to make treaties and the legislature's power
to enact domestic legislation, he concludes non-self-execution affects the
balance of power implicit in the Constitution's structure. 147 Giving force to
treaties has an effect almost indiscernible from domestic lawmaking. But
since there is almost no limit to the scope of the treaty-making power, 48
such domestic power exists nowhere else in the Constitution. Professor
Yoo notes that making such treaties self-executing would vest potentially
limitless legislative power in the executive branch through its treaty-
making power, contravening Article I's exclusive vesting of limited legis-
lative power in Congress.'4 9 He concludes that non-self-execution doctrine
prevents the executive from usurping Congress's exclusive Article I power
to enact domestic legislation.' Like Professor Vazquez, Professor Yoo
focuses exclusively upon the treaty's potential national effects. His argu-
ment does not touch upon treaties that regulate domestic matters outside
Congress's legislative matters, such as matters left to the states. His analy-
sis thus implicitly leaves the door open for a non-federal implementation
possibility. Giving treaties effect at the state level would avert the struc-
tural separation-of-powers problems he discusses.
This distinction between treaties treading upon "Article I areas" and
treaties affecting areas reserved to the states becomes particularly signifi-
cant when combined with the Supremacy Clause. The clause subordinates
state law to the laws and treaties of the federal government.' -' Self-
execution is irrelevant to this subordinate relationship: regardless of the
position one takes in the scholarly debate about the treaty's force at the
federal level, the treaty supersedes state law as a purely constitutional mat-
145. Id. at 2250 (citing 5 ANNALS OF CONGRmss 468 (1796) (speech of Albert Gallatin)).
146. See Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 12 (making a historical argument to
support this conclusion); Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 12 (making a textual and
structural argument to support this conclusion).
147. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 12, at 2223.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 122-125.
149. Yoo, Treaties as Public Lawmaking, supra note 12, at 2236-39.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2249-50.
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ter. 52 It is only at the state level that Professor Vazquez's reliance on the
Supremacy Clause has genuine force." 3
Historical evidence from the Framing also supports this conclusion
regarding the applicability of non-self-execution doctrine exclusively to
national treaty implementation, rather than to state implementation.
Professor Yoo explains, "When treaties encroached on areas within
Congressional authority... the Framers believed that the House would
have a role, not by formally consenting to the treaty, but through its powers
over legislation and budget in implementing the treaty."'54 According to
Professor Yoo, negotiation of the Jay Treaty with Great Britain in 1795
presented a fulcrum for debate over treaty self-execution in the nascent
republic. 5  The debate, however, focused upon implementation at the
national level, and the treaty's intrusion upon Congress's enumerated
Article I powers.'56 A few decades later, when non-self-execution doctrine
first came before the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson,57 Chief Justice
Marshall used the same rationale when he ruled that for non-self-executing
treaties to have domestic effect, they must be "carried into execution by the
sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument."'5 8 Professor
Yoo explains, "Marshall's approach codified the rule of non-self-execution
that had originated in the Framing debates and had further developed
during the fight over the Jay Treaty."' 59 In relying on the "sovereign
power" to execute a treaty in order to give it effect, Marshall was pointing
to the national government. As with other sources, he was only considering
the non-self-execution controversy in terms of a national implementation
scheme. These sources suggest that the non-self-execution doctrine's roots
lie fully in the controversy over the treaty-making power and Congress's
Article I power to legislate. 6 The historical evidence thus supports the
textual and structural analysis: nothing in non-self-execution necessarily
speaks to implementation by states locally when the treaty does not impact
152. Professor Yoo, however, notes that Madison believed that the Supremacy Clause does not
"address whether and how state executives and legislatures must give effect to treaties ..." Id. at
2250.
153. For example, reading "state law" into his argument for "domestic law" would lend the
result: "concluding that the Constitution gives treaties, once made, 'automatic' effect [over state law]
requires only a reading of the Supremacy Clause, which declares 'all' treaties to be the 'supreme Law
of the Land."' Vazquez, supra note 13, at 2156-57 ("over state law" inserted for "as domestic law").
The change brings his argument into harmony with the Supremacy Clause's comparison of state and
federal law, and solves Professor Yoo's criticism, bringing both of their arguments into relative accord
on this point.
154. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 12, at 2223.
155. See Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 12, at 1280-84.
156. Id. at 2083-84.
157. 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
158. Id. at314.
159. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 12, at 2091.
160. See id. at 2092.
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Congress's legislative power. The absence of federal implementing legisla-
tion pursuant to Congress's Article I powers thus has no effect upon
whether a treaty supersedes state laws under Article VI.
Thus, instead of negating the Covenant's force, non-self-execution
merely transfers its force from the federal government to the states. Indeed,
the treaty ratification debates imply that the Bush Administration and the
Senate intended to give states the opportunity to implement the treaty in
their own distinct ways. The flexibility afforded by the Senate's deference
to states presents California with an opportunity to correct violative provi-
sions through normal legislative or executive channels. However, in the
absence of implementation activity by the other two branches, state court
judges must strike down laws that diverge from the treaty's mandates. The
state judiciary provides a final, necessary stop-gap between the Covenant
and state laws which violate it.
2. Historical Misinterpretation of Federal Self-Execution Doctrine in
California
Unfortunately, although the Constitution requires states to give force
to the human rights treaty provisions in the Covenant, state courts some-
times erroneously interpret federal non-self-execution doctrine to short-
circuit the Supremacy Clause. This confusion has a long pedigree in
California courts. In previous decades, the California Supreme Court twice
took up the issue of non-self-execution as it relates to enforcing human
rights agreements. In both cases, however, the court looked at international
accords that differed significantly from the Covenant, both in specificity
and ratification history. One case involved mere U.N. General Assembly
resolutions never adopted by the United States; 6 the other involved the
U.N. Charter, a treaty with vague, general international aims.1 62 The court
in each case chose not to enforce the international documents and relied on
federal non-self-execution doctrine to justify its decision. 16' For example,
in choosing to disregard U.N. General Assembly resolutions frowning
upon the imposition of the death penalty, the court declared that "a
treaty ... has no effect upon domestic law unless it either is implemented
by Congress or is self-executing."'" Such language, however, had no place
in the opinion: there was simply no treaty before the court, self-executing
or otherwise. The court not only misconstrued the federal nature of self-
execution doctrine, but also its relevance to a nontreaty.
161. People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250, 1276 (Cal. 1987) (upholding a death penalty law despite
defendant's claim that the law violated international law).
162. Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617, 619 (Cal. 1952).
163. Ghent, 739 P.2d at 1275-76; Fuii, 242 P.2d at 619.
164. Ghent, 739 P.2d at 1276.
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The Ghent court's error stemmed from its reliance upon an earlier
court's analysis of the applicability of the U.N. Charter to California law in
Fujii v. California. In that case, the state's Supreme Court considered the
effect of that international document upon California's Alien Land Law.'65
The Alien Land Law prohibited real estate ownership by aliens unless they
were either eligible for citizenship or there was a treaty between their coun-
try of origin and the United States authorizing such ownership. 66 However,
Mr. Fujii, a native of Japan, did not meet either of these conditions. When
he nevertheless acquired real estate, a lower court ordered that his property
escheat to the state of California. 67 On appeal, he argued that the U.N.
Charter superseded California's Alien Land Law because it "pledg[ed] the
member nations to promote the observance of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms without distinction as to race."' 68 In considering Mr. Fujii's
argument, the court committed two grave errors in its analysis of non-self-
execution doctrine. First, although the court did not dispute that the Charter
is a treaty binding judges in every state, it asserted that "[a] treaty... does
not automatically supersede local laws which are inconsistent with it unless
the treaty provisions are self-executing."' 69 The court thus ruled that in the
absence of implementing legislation, the Charter's force at the state level
turned solely on the issue of non-self-execution. 70 Thus, because the court
found that the Charter was non-self-executing, it held that the Charter had
no force at the state level. The Fujii court's misreading of the Supremacy
Clause has haunted California's courts for decades. 171
In determining criteria for analyzing whether the treaty was self-
executing, the court committed its second error. Although self-execution is
fundamentally a question inappropriate for state courts, the court looked at
the nature and purpose of the treaty to decide whether to enforce it. The
Charter merely set forth the purpose of the United Nations.' Primarily
expressive in nature, it simply declared that the United Nations "shall
promote" various human rights goals and international cooperation. 7 ' It
created no specific internal legal obligations for signatories other than a
duty to cooperate with the new international organization. 74 The California
Supreme Court interpreted this lack of specificity as evidence of the treaty
framers' intent to make the document non-self-executing. 17
165. Fufii, 242 P.2d at 619.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 620.
170. Id. at 620-23.
171. See, e.g., Ghent, 739 P.2d at 1276.
172. Id.
173. Fufii, 242 P.2d at 621.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 621-22.
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This approach is devoid of constitutional authority. The California
Supreme Court put itself in the position of selecting which federal treaties
it would consider "supreme Law of the Land." It blatantly ignored the
explicit command in Article VI regarding "all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States .... ," For the
words "all Treaties," the California Supreme Court effectively seemed to
have inserted "whichever treaties individual states decide are self-
executing, based on criteria states choose." This approach in California
implicitly held that individual state courts can use self-execution as a
means of sorting out which federal treaties the state will obey.
In divining non-self-execution from the purported intent of the treaty
framers, the Fujii court also seemed to suggest that it was appropriate for
states to make such determinations themselves, opening the door for con-
flicting determinations of self-execution in different states. Such a bizarre
path could lead to hypothetical situations in which New York's courts
might interpret the framer's intent for a given treaty to be such that the
document is self-executing and thus worthy of enforcement, while
California's courts interpret it to be non-self-executing and thus unenforce-
able. Such peculiar state power regarding treaty enforcement conjures the
historical specter of the Articles of Confederation, in which individual
states simply chose for themselves whether the nation's treaties would
supersede their own laws.17 7 The Framers adopted the Supremacy Clause
precisely to remedy such an unmanageable, chaotic situation.178 The
California Supreme Court's flawed approach thus runs contrary both to the
Constitution's plain text and its federal structure.
The California Supreme Court may soon have an opportunity to cor-
rect the error of the Fujii court. Proposition 21's violation of the Covenant
presents the court with a fresh chance to consider the state's obligation
under the Supremacy Clause. The court can dispose of its past misplaced
reliance on the intent of the treaty framers, the treaty specificity, and any
other purported relics of Fujii's self-execution reasoning. Instead, the court
176. U.S. CONsr. art VI.
177. See Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 12, at 2019-20. This historical specter is
by no means entirely hypothetical or confined to the issue of state non-self-execution decisions. It has
recently arisen in another context in which a state decided for itself whether to give effect to a
particular treaty: in July 2001, Oklahoma's governor, Frank Keating, had to decide whether to give
effect to certain Vienna Convention rights in a capital punishment case in which the governor admitted
a treaty breach had occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5. While making his decision as to
whether the state would enforce the rights mandated by the treaty, Keating engaged in direct
negotiations with Mexico's President, Vincente Fox, over the matter. See Letter from Governor Keating
to Vincente Fox, supra note 5. He thus put Oklahoma in the historically awkward position of
independently negotiating with a foreign head-of-state over a federal treaty's enforceability and
implementation.
178. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 12, at 2026-31 (discussing the genesis of the
Supremacy Clause in the Virginia and New Jersey Plans at the Constitutional Convention).
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should obey Article VI's explicit command and enforce the treaty over
conflicting state laws like Proposition 21.
Though states cannot ignore the Covenant's mandate under the
Supremacy Clause, nothing in that clause necessarily speaks to the federal
judiciary; rather, it speaks to state judiciaries when confronted with super-
seding federal law.'79 This situation potentially creates a schism between
state and federal courts. The Covenant thus could have force in one court
system, while possibly being nonjusticiable in the other.
3. Limitations on Enforcement of Covenant Rights by Federal Courts
Though the federal judiciary has a role to play in upholding Covenant
rights, as a practical matter, it will rarely hear challenges to state laws vio-
lating the Covenant. Challenges to laws like Proposition 21 will most
likely take place in state courts for the simple reason that the juveniles are
charged there. Habeas corpus petitions present the significant exception to
this situation and are a special difficulty for federal courts. 8 '
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that defendants lose the right to
raise a defense based on a treaty provision in a habeas corpus petition be-
fore a federal court if they fail first to develop the factual basis of the treaty
defense in state court. 8 ' In Breard v. Greene, a defendant sentenced to
death in state court exhausted all appeals.'82 Five years after his conviction,
he filed a motion for habeas relief in U.S. district court, arguing for the first
time that his arrest violated a provision of the Vienna Convention.'83 As a
foreign national, this treaty obligated arresting authorities to advise him
that he had the right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate.'84 The Supreme
Court held that Mr. Breard procedurally defaulted on his claim to the treaty
right by failing to raise it earlier in state court. 8 5 The Court noted that after
the treaty was ratified by the United States, Congress enacted the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 186 which mandated
that petitions for habeas relief alleging violations of treaties of the United
States will "not be afforded an evidentiary hearing if [the petitioner] 'has
failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in State court
proceedings."" 87  Under the Court's long-standing "last-in-time"
179. See supra text accompanying notes 144-145.
180. A writ of habeus corpus permits a prisoner to challenge a state conviction in federal court on
constitutional grounds. The purpose is not to reevaluate guilt or innocence, but rather the legality of
imprisonment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 491 (6th ed. 1991); see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9; 28
U.S.C.A. § 2241.
181. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
182. Id. at 373.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at375.
186. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (1998).
187. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (Supp. 1998)).
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doctrine,188 this later congressional act nullified the treaty to the extent that
it conflicted with the treaty." 9 Thus, the Court found Mr. Breard had no
claim to the treaty right.'90
The AEDPA, fortified with the holding in Breard v. Green, has sig-
nificant ramifications for the exercise of Covenant rights by state criminal
defendants seeking postconviction habeas relief in federal court. It be-
comes critically important to develop the factual basis of those rights early
in a defendant's movement through the state justice system before the de-
fendant reaches federal court. The rights cannot be invoked in a habeas
petition if they have not been asserted in earlier proceedings. No matter
what position one takes on the problem of federal non-self-execution, the
doors to federal courts are indisputably barred to criminal defendants who
bring their Covenant rights before federal courts too late.
Though habeas corpus petitions represent the most likely means of
bringing to federal court a challenge of a state law based on a Covenant
right, federal courts have already entertained claims based on the treaty in
other contexts. The next Part of this Comment will survey the practical ef-
fect of Covenant rights in federal courts outside of the AEDPA/Breard
limitation upon habeas petitions. Congress has granted federal district
courts original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under... treaties
of the United States."' 9 ' Federal courts have already heard several civil
claims based on Covenant rights. Furthermore, one U.S. district court has
recently recognized a plaintiffs right to sue a police department for civil
damages for breaching a Vienna Convention treaty right, finding that the
breach was a violation of the plaintiffs civil rights, actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.92 This holding suggests that federal courts may have a role
in remedying violations of treaty rights that goes far beyond the habeas
context.' 93
188. This doctrine refers to a rule dating back to 1888 that requires that "if a treaty and a federal
statute conflict, 'the one last in date will control the other."' Id. at 376. See also Vazquez, supra note
13, at 2189; Bradley, supra note 10, at 457; John C. Yoo, Politics as Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, The Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 851, 912 (2001).
189. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
190. The International Court of Justice recently disagreed with the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the treaty obligation under such circumstances. See International Court of Justice,
supra note 3. Although the ICJ never reviewed the Breard case directly, in June 2001 it issued a ruling
in Germany v. United States, a case with an almost identical fact pattern. The case involved precisely
the same Vienna Convention rights at issue in Breard, and the ICJ ruled unequivocally that the United
States violated the treaty under such circumstances. Id.
191. 28U.S.C.A. § 1331.
192. Standtv. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d417, 427-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
193. Deval Patrick, who served as Assistant Attorney General to the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Division, represented to the Human Rights committee in 1995 that his department was
"concerned" about possible discriminatory effects of Proposition 187 in California. His remarks, in the
context of a review of Covenant implementation in the United States, seemed to imply that the Justice
Department had not ruled out using the Covenant to challenge such state laws in federal court. See
Human Rights Committee Continues Examination, supra note 65, at 9.
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It is thus conceivable that a plaintiff might ask a federal court to
enjoin enforcement of a state law violating the Covenant. The Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, however, has important implications
for such cases because it limits federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals
against states. 194 Since 1908, however, the Supreme Court has held that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar private suits against state officials for
prospective enforcement of a federal right, in cases where such suits seek
to enjoin enforcement of a preempted or otherwise constitutionally invalid
state law. 95 In 1997, in a fractured plurality opinion reconsidering the
modem contours of the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign
immunity, only Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist advocated
reconceptualizing the doctrine to limit private suits against states in federal
court only to cases where there is no available state forum to adjudicate the
dispute.196 Three concurring justices led by Justice O'Connor, however,
joined the four dissenting justices in strongly endorsing the continued
vitality of the traditional understanding of the Ex Parte Young decision,
rejecting the proposed narrowing offered by Justice Kennedy. 97 Under
O'Connor's view, which is controlling on this point, a private suit against
state officials is permissible in federal court if "a plaintiff alleges an
ongoing violation offederal law, and where the relief sought is prospective
rather than retrospective."'98
The Supremacy Clause makes it clear that the corpus of federal law
encompasses the nation's treaties; treaties, like any other federal law, pre-
empt any conflicting state law. O'Connor's language in the Coeur d'Alene
decision left a narrow door open for private suits against state officials in
order to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are an "ongoing violation" of
a federal treaty obligation. The Court appears willing to concede that such
suits continue to be an exception to states' otherwise sweeping sovereign
immunity from private suit in federal court.'99 This principle arguably
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). In 1996, the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted this limit very broadly to give states sweeping immunity from suit in federal court in
many instances. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
195. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 167-68 (1908).
196. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270-78 (1997).
197. See id. at 288, 291-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also id. at 298-301 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
198. Id. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
199. Similarly, in the Seminole Tribe decision in 1996, the Court noted that federal jurisdiction
exists over "a suit against state officials when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order
to 'end a continuing violation of federal law."' Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73 (quoting Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 977 (1985)). It is important to note how narrowly drawn this exception to the
Eleventh Amendment's immunity from suit is. The Court has acknowledged only a right to seek
"prospective injunctive relief," not any other sort of remedy. Id.
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provides a basis for challenging state laws that violate the Covenant by
suing state officials in federal court.
Non-self-execution doctrine, however, is an important limit on the
scope of such suits in federal venues. In ruling on the enforceability of such
treaty rights, the federal courts appear to have developed an implicit two-
tiered enforcement structure, making the rights justiciable when asserted by
a citizen defensively as protection from the government, but non-self-
executing (and thus nonjusticiable before federal courts) when asserted by
a citizen in a private cause of action in civil litigation.
a. Current Status of Covenant Rights Before Federal Courts
The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the domestic enforceabil-
ity of the Covenant in federal courts. In one of the few cases to address the
matter after ratification, the Court decided the case on other grounds. In a
footnote, the Court refused to rule on the Covenant's validity in the case."'
In the absence of a clear ruling from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have not shied away from adjudicating claims of violations of Covenant
rights. Since ratification, the Ninth Circuit considered at least three cases
involving Covenant rights and decided each case on its merits. In 1996, a
plaintiff claimed that restrictions on travel to Cuba violated Covenant
rights.20' The panel of judges decided the matter in part by interpreting the
Covenant in relation to the challenged statute.02 Although it found that the
challenge to the statute failed based on its interpretation of the Covenant's
meaning, the court never suggested that non-self-execution prevented it
from adjudicating Covenant rights for a citizen.0 3 Two years later in a suit
alleging arbitrary arrest, the plaintiff based the claim in part on the Cove-
nant's prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention.2" The court's opinion
cited the Covenant's text at length, then found the detention was not arbi-
trary within the meaning of the international obligation.2"' Finally, in early
2000, the Ninth Circuit considered an immigrant's challenge to a deporta-
tion detention by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In striking
down the government's policy of indefinite detention, the court expressly
200. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 695 n.16 (1998) (finding the appellant made no claim
under the Covenant and the treaty's enforceability was thus not before the Court). In this case, a
resident alien was suspected of having once been a participant in Nazi war crimes. He refused to
answer questions pursuant to a subpoena, asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege based on his fear of
prosecution in Israel, Lithuania, or Germany. Id. at 670. Since those countries were signatories to the
Covenant, and the Covenant recognizes a right similar to the U.S. Fifth Amendment, treaty
enforcement could have come into play. Id. at 695 n.16. Balsys failed to raise such a claim, relieving
the Court of the need to decide the treaty's domestic impact. Id.
201. Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1443 (9th Cir. 1996).
202. Id. at 1441-42.
203. Id.
204. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998).
205. Id.
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relied upon on article nine of the Covenant.2 °6 The Ninth Circuit consis-
tently treated the Covenant rights as theoretically enforceable in these
cases: each opinion turned on the case's facts and legal arguments rather
than justiciability of Covenant rights.
The Eleventh Circuit recently went a step further. In United States v.
Duarte-Acero,2 °7 it considered whether, under the Covenant, a Colombian
national's incarceration in Colombia barred his subsequent incarceration in
the United States for the same offense, namely the abduction and attempted
murder of an American Drug Enforcement Agency agent in Colombia.2"8
The court noted in a footnote that the Senate declaration upon ratification
purported to make the rights in question non-self-executing.0 9
Nevertheless, it interpreted the specific Covenant provisions governing the
claimed rights in the case."'0 It held that "[t]he clear language of [the
Covenant] manifests that its provisions are to govern the relationship
between an individual and his state...."" Ultimately, and "most
importantly perhaps," '212 the court looked to the U.N. Human Rights
Committee as a source of interpretative authority of the treaty's language
because it is "the body charged under [the Covenant] with monitoring its
implementation... ,,2"3 In the absence of a compelling reason to depart
from the committee's statement on the matter, the court upheld the com-
mittee's view, finding that the Covenant does not bar prosecution in U.S.
courts despite an earlier conviction for the same offense in courts of
another party state.2" 4
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly agreed with the Ninth Circuit
that it had authority to hear and decide a claim based on a Covenant right,
despite the Senate's non-self-execution RUD. More importantly, however,
the Eleventh Circuit went a step further by looking to the Covenant's own
enforcement mechanism as a source of interpretive authority; it cited the
Human Rights Committee and acknowledged that body's role in oversee-
ing treaty implementation. The non-self-execution RUD seems to have
been no deterrent to judicial implementation of the treaty based on the
principles handed down from the Human Rights Committee. The case is
206. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 (9th Cir. 2000). Though the Supreme Court reviewed the
Ninth Circuit's decision recently, it considered a separate question in the case. In a consolidated ruling
governing both Ma's case and a similar challenge by another immigrant in the Fifth Circuit, the Court
found that the INS policy of indefinite detention was impermissible. It reached the decision on statutory
interpretation grounds, thus avoiding the question of the Covenant's enforceability. Zadvydas v. Davis,
121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001).
207. 208 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2000).
208. Id. at 1283-84.
209. Id. at 1284 n.8.
210. Id. at 1285-89.
211. Id. at 1286.
212. Id. at 1287.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1287-88.
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significant because it shows a court's nascent effort to venture outside U.S.
precedent, ratification history, and the intent of the treaty framers to derive
domestic enforcement principles directly from the international body
charged with overseeing the treaty.
The Tenth Circuit stands alone in entirely rejecting the Covenant as a
source of binding legal authority. In an unpublished order and judgment, it
decided that the Covenant's "provisions call upon governments to take
certain action and are not addressed to the judicial branch of our
government. They do not, by their terms, confer rights upon individual
citizens . 21' In that case, a prisoner filed a claim pro se, alleging that
prison authorities in Colorado violated his rights under the Covenant and
various other treaties.216 The court tersely dismissed his suit without oral
argument, in part for lack of standing to bring a private claim under the
Covenant.217 The court did not consider self-execution doctrine, any of the
Covenant's actual language, or the structure of its obligation. However, it
is possible that the lack of counsel to assist with claims based on complex
treaty law led to an erroneous result. Indeed, this idea finds support in the
circuit's own limitation of the order: "This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel."218
Until the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split, the stream of prece-
dent coming from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits seems to represent an
emerging majority view. This view demonstrates a clear willingness to
consider the Covenant's domestic impact, interpret its provisions, and ad-
judicate citizens' rights under the treaty in cases in which those rights are
asserted to protect the citizens from government conduct forbidden under
the treaty. Such rights are not the only ones the treaty creates, however.
Under the treaty's terms, it also protects citizens from each other. The
treaty thus purports to bind private citizens, in addition to binding the rati-
fying nation's government.1 9 In the very rare cases in which citizens have
used civil litigation to call on federal courts to enforce Covenant rights
against infringement by other citizens, federal courts have balked. Under
215. Kylerv. Montezuma County, No. 99-1052,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1145, at *4 (10th Cir. Jan.
28,2000).
216. Id. at *24.
217. Id. at *4.
218. Id. at*1.
219. Examples include the Covenant's prohibition on hate speech, Covenant, supra note 1, at art.
20, par. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178, its guarantee of protection of children by family and society, Id. art.
24, par. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, and its affirmation of the right of minority groups to "enjoy their own
culture... religion... [or] language." Id. art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. The preamble requires that "the
individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant ... " Id. at Preamble, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
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such circumstances, in the primary example decided thus far, the court
found the rights nonjusticiable because the treaty is non-self-executing.2 0
b. Two-Tiered Federal Enforcement of Covenant Rights
Though relatively few cases have addressed the Covenant since its
ratification in 1995, the emerging pattern of federal opinions suggests that
where the claimed rights are rights protecting individuals from the state,
they are justiciable; where the treaty rights are asserted defensively to pro-
tect individuals from behavior prohibited by the treaty, the courts can
evaluate the claim under the Covenant and render a decision based on the
case's facts, but where the claim involves Covenant rights between private
parties in civil litigation, the absence of legislation implementing those
rights renders courts helpless to provide a remedy.
The new federal approach to the Covenant further complicates the
treaty's already complex judicial enforcement structure. As discussed
above, the Supremacy Clause requires enforcement of the treaty at the state
level in its entirety; at the federal level, however, these recent cases suggest
the enforcement doctrine depends on what type of Covenant right is being
asserted, and in what context. Thus, while state courts must universally
enforce the treaty without regard to non-self-execution, the federal courts
are coalescing around an approach that solves the non-self-execution prob-
lem by dividing Covenant rights into two classes. Federal courts enforce
those Covenant rights asserted to protect citizens from government action
forbidden by the treaty, thereby treating the rights as inherently justiciable
despite the absence of implementing legislation. Other rights involving
private, civil claims, however, receive no enforcement in the absence of
such implementing legislation. Non-self-execution thus seems to affect
only Covenant rights that serve as a basis for a private cause of action in
federal court.
Although federal courts have not yet explicitly articulated this rule in
relation to the Covenant, its application is apparent from this emerging pat-
tern of decisions. This rule is not a novel innovation. Some scholars have
argued that non-self-execution means nothing more than that the treaty cre-
ates no private right to sue; such an understanding of non-self-execution in
no way precludes the treaty from being invoked defensively against the
government.221
This interpretation of non-self-execution is historically controversial.
An alternate interpretation of the doctrine holds that such treaties have no
220. See, e.g., White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (holding that the Covenant
did not create a private cause of action for "crimes against humanity" against various corporations
allegedly conducting involuntary radiation experiments).
221. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing
Declarations andHuman Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 151-52 (1999).
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force as domestic law at all. 2 Because the Covenant's own terms require
that signatories provide individuals whose rights are violated with a rem-
edy before "competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities"'
and "enforce such remedies when granted,"' 4  any definition of
non-self-execution that denies the treaty force as federal, domestic law
conflicts with the treaty's purpose, structure, and accepted obligation. An
attempt to read the non-self-execution declaration as making all of the
treaty's rights and obligations unenforceable in American courts would
lead to the conclusion that the United States chose to "ratify" the treaty by
"breaching" the treaty: undertaking an obligation to provide an effective
judicial remedy while at the same time making such a remedy effectively
impossible in U.S. courts. The manifestly absurd results of such a broad
reading of the declaration argue for its implausibility. By contrast the nar-
row definition of non-self-execution as a limit only upon private causes of
action renders a more logical result: pursuant to ratification, federal courts
can enforce Covenant rights when asserted defensively to prevent the gov-
ernment from breaching the treaty obligation it undertook.
The Covenant's history subsequent to ratification also supports read-
ing non-self-execution as applicable only to private causes of action.25 The
treaty requires the United States to report to the U.N. Human Rights
Committee on the status of the treaty rights domestically, and U.S. gov-
ernment submitted its initial report in 1995.226 The report assured the
Human Rights Committee that "the [non-self-execution] declaration did
not limit the international obligations of the United States under the
Covenant. The Covenant did not, by itself, create private rights directly
enforceable in United States courts." 7 At a meeting on March 31, 1995,
the committee considered the report. Conrad K. Harper, a member of the
U.S. delegation serving as Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department,
spoke to the committee of "litigants invok[ing] the Covenant," 8 noting
that while "the Covenant could not provide a cause of action, courts could
refer to the Covenant and take guidance from it. '22 9 Most importantly,
"[w]hat it could do, and did, was to establish and enforce uniform
222. Id. at 147-48 (suggesting that the Supreme Court historically has appeared to adopt this
position). But see id. at 152-68 (reviewing conflicting positions adopted by some past presidents during
treaty ratification, including the Bush administration, which sometimes adopted the "private cause of
action" definition of non-self-execution).
223. Covenant, supra note 1, at art. 2. para. 3(b), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
224. Id. art. 2, para. 3(c), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
225. Historically, the conduct of treaty parties has sometimes played an important role in courts'
interpretation of intent in analyzing the document. See Riesenfeld & Abbot, supra note 47, at 616.
226. See O'FLAHERTY, supra note 50, at 44.
227. Human Rights Committee Continues Examination, supra note 65, at 2. See also
Consideration of Reports, supra note 45, at 4.
228. Human Rights Committee Continues Examination, supra note 65, at 4.
229. Id. at 5.
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standards for the respect of civil and political rights .... That could
include direct invalidation of any offending laws at the state level. "230
These representations by the U.S. delegation pleased some of the
committee members.23' The committee's official comments about the
report explain, "The Committee takes note of the position expressed by the
delegation that, notwithstanding the non-self-executing declaration of the
United States, courts of the United States are not prevented from seeking
guidance from the Covenant in interpreting United States law. 2 312 These
representations to the Human Rights Committee closely track the approach
to non-self-execution the federal courts seem to have adopted with respect
to the Covenant. Although no federal court has cited these representations,
the pattern of holdings suggest that courts have adopted a two-tiered sys-
tem of enforcement that mirrors the manner in which the U.S. delegation
described the non-self-execution declaration's scope: namely, in the
absence of implementing legislation, it only prevents litigants from using
the treaty as a basis for a private cause of action. It does not affect the
courts' ability to enforce the treaty in other situations, such as relying on
the Covenant rights defensively in a criminal prosecution. Federal judges
thus have the power to enforce the Covenant in all criminal matters they
hear. However, except in the narrow category of habeas cases in which the
Covenant right was not asserted timely in state court, federal courts are
unlikely to encounter cases involving challenges to state laws like
Proposition 21. Thus, state judiciaries, which hear cases involving juvenile
transfer to adult court on a daily basis, provide the most obvious means for
bringing "rogue states" like California into compliance with the treaty.
Juveniles prosecuted as adults have legal standing to challenge the adult
court's jurisdiction, based on the Covenant's guarantee that they be treated
with regard to their age.
CONCLUSION
By ratifying the Covenant, the United States made a promise to
enforce the treaty's rights domestically. Although the Senate blurred the
terms of that promise with a tangle of RUDs, a close reading of the ratifica-
tion documents reveals that the contours of the original promise remain
intact. When state laws like California's Proposition 21 violate the treaty's
terms with respect to government behavior, both state and federal courts
have a duty to enforce the treaty.
Despite the Senate's federalism RUD, both the treaty's own terms and
the text of the Supremacy Clause require that its provisions apply without
230. Id.
231. Human Rights Committee Continues Examination, supra note 65, at 8.
232. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant.
Comments of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/AD.50 (April 7, 1995) at 3, para. 11.
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exception to all fifty states. Although human rights treaties necessarily
reach into areas normally controlled at a state level, a long stream of
Supreme Court precedent supports such use of the national treaty power.
Federalism provides no refuge for state interests in the area of foreign
affairs. Juvenile justice laws are no exception to this general rule.
Similarly, just as the federalism RUD fails to shield states from the
treaty's effect, the Constitution's text, structure, and history make it clear
that the Senate's non-self-execution RUD fails as well. Non-self-execution
has conceptual coherence only when applied to treaty enforcement at the
federal level. At the state level, even non-self-executing treaties must have
effect under the Supremacy Clause. State courts thus have a constitutional
duty to enforce such treaties above their own laws, even in the absence of
implementing legislation.
In California, the example of Proposition 21's preemption may raise
legitimate concerns that the treaty power is antimajoritarian. Application of
the Covenant in this case will supersede the clear will of 4.5 million voters.
Such an argument could apply to virtually any preemption of popular state
laws under the Supremacy Clause. The Constitution's structure, however,
vests a democratic element in the treaty power through the
Senate: California's Senators, like those of other states, had an opportunity
to consider the Covenant in 1993 and consider withholding their consent to
ratification. Although the treaty now trumps local democracy, it can do so
only because it was initially adopted pursuant to the Constitution's
national, democratic safeguard on the treaty power.
In light of this situation, California's Supreme Court should embrace
its constitutional duty to uphold the treaty. It should recognize that the non-
self-execution RUD does not speak to state courts, but instead only com-
mands federal courts to limit the treaty's use as a basis for a private cause
of action. In reviewing Proposition 21, the California court now faces a
glaring discrepancy between the state's practice of trying juveniles as
adults, and the Covenant's requirement that juvenile trials take account of
the minors' age. The court's path ought to be clear: despite a history of
misconstruing its role in enforcing human rights treaties, it should now cor-
rect its error by giving force to the Covenant and acknowledging the
impact of Article VI upon state law.
California's situation is not unique. Throughout the country, other
state courts are similarly obligated to enforce the Covenant when faced
with conflicting state law. Such conflicts may emerge regarding any of the
Covenant's provisions; in addition to providing express rights to criminal
defendants, the Covenant also addresses other areas of law. Examples
include guarantees of protection of privacy, 33 labor rights, 34 marriage
233. Covenant, supra note 1, at art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
234. Id. art. 22, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
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rights and family law,235 and cultural rights of ethnic minorities.236 Any
existing state laws in these areas that do not conform to the Covenant's
terms would be vulnerable to preemption. The treaty's impact upon state
judiciaries is thus potentially enormous.
Although this Comment has focused upon the role of courts to enforce
the treaty's terms at the state level, there are several other methods to bring
"rogue states" into compliance with the Covenant. In light of states' wide-
spread disregard for the treaty's obligations, so long as Congress continues
to defer to the states in this area, state legislatures could fully execute the
Covenant by whatever means they deem appropriate. In California, voter
repeal of Proposition 21 also remains theoretically possible, though
unlikely given the measure's recent popularity. Even if any of these
implementation possibilities were to come to pass, legislative methods like
these are slow. The urgency of the situation merits faster interven-
tion: each of the thousands of children transferred to adult court each year
represents an additional potentially aggrieved party. Courts thus present the
best hope for bringing California and other states into compliance with
U.S. obligations under the Covenant, at least until elected representatives
take an interest in the treaty.
Unfortunately, lack of judicial awareness of this international obliga-
tion presents a tremendous practical hurdle in California, as in every other
state. The Human Rights Committee harshly criticized the United States
for failing to educate the legal establishment about treaty rights. It chided,
"The judiciary must be made aware of the evolving legal standards coming
out of the application of the Covenant." '237 This problem is likely to worsen
as the Covenant's ratification recedes into the dustbin of history. The
United States' second periodic report updating the Human Rights
Committee on this country's progress will undoubtedly have little good
news on this front.238
235. Id. art. 23-24, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
236. Id. art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
237. Human Rights Committee Continues Consideration of United States' Initial Report, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess., 1402nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. HR/CT/401 (1995), available at
gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/uncurr/press releases/HR/CT/95_03/401.
238. The report is presently overdue. It was due to the Human Rights Committee on July 9, 1998.
O'FLAHERTY, supra note 50, at 44.
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